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This dissertation contains three chapters related to housing markets. First two chapters 
study the vertical variation in housing prices, and the third chapter models buy-sellers.  
The first focus is the vertical dimension of housing markets. Location is the most 
important factor in determining housing prices. However, in multi-unit residential 
markets, two housing units in one building share the same location but may still have 
different transaction prices. The first chapter is to explore why. To identify the 
explanatory factors, the author collects over 200,000 transaction records from 2012-
2016 in Beijing and provides rich and valid empirical evidence. Also, this chapter 
proposes a least nugget effects estimator (LNE) as an alternative to the conventional 
fixed effects estimator (FE). LNE is essentially a pairwise differences estimator (PD) 
whose comparison with FE in linear fixed effects models is studied in the second 
chapter. 
The second focus of this dissertation is a type of households who are both home 
buyer and home seller at the same time (called “buy-sellers”). The traditional framework 
would model such households as two independent identities. However, this dichotomic 
tradition ignores the essential feature of the buy-sellers, that is, the interdependence 
between buying and selling decisions. As a buyer, a new purchase depends on a 
successful sale due to budget and policy restrictions; as a seller, a sale may rely on the 
success in bidding to avoid renting for a living. This interdependence results in a 
 connected bidding network. One’s success or failure in bidding or selling will influence 
others’. Chapter three, for the first time, studies this type of households and proposes an 
agent-based model (ABM) with buy-sellers. Then, the author uses this ABM to analyze 
the effects of housing purchase restrictions and home brokerage on market outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
VERTICAL VARIATION IN HOUSING PRICES—A LEAST NUGGET EFFECT 
APPROACH 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Multi-unit residential markets (MRMs) have been developed around the world1 and studied 
in many empirical hedonic analyses. One feature of these markets is the vertical variation 
in housing prices—that is, housing units in one building are transacted at different prices. 
Units in one building share the same location and neighborhood but may still differ in 
structural characteristics and transaction times. They could be on different floors, have 
different numbers of rooms, or face different directions. They could be transacted under 
different market conditions—prices may rapidly change in a housing boom or bust. Hence, 
the vertical variation in housing prices reflects people’s preference for the structural 
attributes and temporal fluctuation of housing prices.  
Most hedonic analyses of MRMs identified the structural and temporal effects using 
overall price variations on both vertical and horizontal dimensions (e.g., Gao & Asami, 
2011; Jim & Chen, 2009; Jim & Chen, 2010; Wong, So, & Hung, 2002; Wong, Chau, Yau, 
& Cheung, 2011), largely because in this way they could estimate the effects of location 
factors (e.g., accessibility and neighborhood quality)—which are always of the most 
interest. However, location factors are inherently complex and subject to misspecification 
in variables (Can, 1992; Dubin, 1992). They may induce measurement errors and omitted 
                                                 
1 Evidence can be found in studies worldwide, such as Singapore (Sing, 2001; Sun, Tu, & Yu, 2005), Hong 
Kong (Jim & Chen, 2009; Bao & Wan, 2004), Beijing (Ekblad & Werne, 1990), Tokyo (Kanemoto & 
Nakamura, 1986), Israel (Mitrany, 2005; Frenkel, 2007), US (Rosen & Walks, 2013), and large cities in 
Europe (Turkington, Van Kempen, & Wassenberg, 2004). 
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variable biases in parameter estimates (Kuminoff, Parmeter, & Pope, 2010). For some 
practices with primary interest in the structural and temporal factors—for example, 
designing floor plans of affordable housing projects or constructing housing price indices, 
the vertical dimension alone would provide better estimates than using overall variations 
because comparing housing units in one building naturally avoids the locational 
endogeneity issues. This paper uses the vertical information of the Beijing resale housing 
market from 2012 to 2016 to identify the explanatory variables for the vertical dimension.  
Methodologically, to investigate housing price variation within one building, a 
conventional choice is to use the within model (fixed effects model) together with the fixed 
effects estimator (FE) 2, viewing the vertical variation as a particular type of within-group 
variation. In addition to applying FE, this paper explores another method using 
semivariograms. In spatial statistics, a semivariogram measures the variance of value 
differences between all pairs of observations with a certain distance apart (Cressie, 1993), 
which has been used in housing studies to model the spatial autocorrelation structure in 
error terms (Dubin, 1992; Basu & Thibodeau, 1998). When the distance between two 
observations in each pair tends to zero, the semivariogram is called the “nugget effect.” 
This paper uses this term and denotes the vertical variation in housing prices as the “nugget 
effect of housing prices”, because the vertical variation can be regarded as the variance of 
price differences between all pairs of housing transactions at the same location (i.e., with 
the certain distance apart tends to zero). To identify the explanatory variables for this 
                                                 
2 It is also called within estimator or covariance estimator. In the context of clustered data, it is referred as 
cluster-specific fixed effects estimator (Cameron & Miller, 2015). It is known that FE and the least squared 
dummy variable estimator (LSDV) estimator are computationally equivalent (Wooldridge, 2010), thus this 
paper will not discuss LSDV separately. 
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nugget effect, this paper estimates a linear hedonic price model by minimizing the nugget 
effect of residuals, instead of minimizing the overall sum of squared residuals as in OLS. 
The estimator is called a least nugget effect estimator (LNE) and is designed to explain 
most of the vertical variation of housing prices—rather than the overall variation.  
Comparing FE and LNE, the essential difference is that FE measures the variation 
using the deviation from the mean in each group; while LNE uses the pairwise differences. 
This paper shows that the LNE is essentially a pairwise differences estimator (PD), whose 
comparison with FE in linear fixed effects models is studied in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 shows that PD (and hence LNE) is a generalized version of FE by 
weighting each observation by its group size. When the data is balanced, i.e., each group 
has the same number of observations, or, when the local estimate of each group is the same, 
FE and PD are equivalent. For MRM housing data, the observed housing transactions are 
grouped by buildings, and this group structure is always unbalanced—buildings have 
different numbers of observations due to their differences in height, transaction frequency, 
and sample size. As a result, applying FE and PD would generate different results. Chapter 
2 also shows that both FE and PD are unbiased and consistent. However, using cluster-
robust standard errors, FE is more efficient than PD when the number of groups is large. 
This condition would be satisfied in MRMs when the number of buildings is massive. The 
empirical results of this paper provide evidence to the theoretical discussions.  
In what follows, Section 1.2 reviews related literature, Section 1.3 introduces the 
estimation approaches; Section 1.4 applies the model to housing data in Beijing, and 
Section 1.5 concludes with key results. 
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1.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hedonic price models regress housing transaction prices3 on structural and spatial 
characteristics and on time variables (Butler, 1982; Freeman, 1981; Quigley, 1995; Tu, 
1997). The regression coefficient of a variable is, ceteris paribus, the marginal change in 
the valuation of the housing unit (Rosen, 1974).  
1.2.1 Estimation of Structural Effects in MRMs 
For the structural charaterisitcs, literature on MRMs provides abundant empirical evidence 
on their estimates. Although the choice may differ by markets and regions, most studies 
involve several common structural variables, for example, floor areas, stories (floor level), 
number of rooms, views, orientations, and building age.  
The floor area is the most common structural characteristic in hedonic housing 
studies (Sirmans, Macpherson, & Zietz, 2005). In the analyses of MRMs, the sign of the 
floor area depends on the choice of the price variable. Many studies use total selling prices 
and suggest a positive effect of the floor area (e.g., Chen, Clapp, & Tirtiroglu, 2011; Mason 
& Quigley, 1996; Xu, 2008; Yu, Han, & Chai, 2007); while some scholars find evidence 
of negative effects (Mok, Chan, & Cho, 1995) when using unit prices—the price per square 
foot (or meter), a common measure of the housing price in regions like Hong Kong and 
other cities in China.   
The number of rooms is expected to correlate with the floor area. However, their 
effects on housing prices could be distinct. People may prefer housing units of a given floor 
area to be divided into more rooms (Borukhov, Ginsberg, & Werczberger, 1978). Positive 
                                                 
3 Some scholars use listing prices or monthly rents (Kain & Quigley, 1970).  
  
16 
 
effect of the number of rooms is found in Tokyo (Shimizu, Takatsuji, Ono, & Nishimura, 
2010) and Israel (Borukhov et al., 1978). Specifically, more bedrooms are associated with 
higher housing prices in Shenzhen, China (Xu, 2008) but with lower prices in Hong Kong 
(Jim & Chen, 2010). Some scholars include bedrooms as dummy variables to identify the 
most preferred number of bedrooms (e.g., Chen et al., 2011). 
The floor level represents the vertical location of housing units and relates to the 
concept of vertical housing price gradients (Wong et al., 2011; Liu, Rosenthal, & Strange, 
2018). In the literature, a higher floor level is correlated with a higher housing price (e.g., 
Yu et al., 2007), which is called a floor-level premium (see a review in Wong et al., 20114). 
The higher the floor is, the fewer street conditions and the better view and air quality the 
housing unit takes (Wong et al., 2002). However, the vertical price gradient could be 
nonlinear. Wong et al. (2011) identify a concave vertical housing price gradient5 and 
suggest a more flexible specification of the floor-levels. Mason & Quigley (1996) apply a 
Generalized Additive Model (GAM) and find a positive but nonlinear floor-level premium 
in Los Angeles. A ground-floor level could add a premium6 in the buildings without lifts 
(Danton & Himbert, 2017) but affect housing prices adversely or insignificantly in other 
situations (Borukhov et al., 1978; Shimizu et al., 2010). Also, people may consider the 
floor level together with the building height and care about the relative position rather than 
the absolute altitude of a housing unit. Some scholars use relative floor or relative floor 
position zone (e.g., high/middle/low) instead of the absolute floor level (e.g., Borukhov et 
                                                 
4 Other than those reviewed in Wong et al. (2011), evidence can also be found in works for Hong Kong 
(Bao & Wan, 2004; Jim & Chen, 2009; Jim & Chen, 2010) and Singapore (Yu et al., 2007). 
5 In rental market, Danton & Himbert (2017) find vertical rent gradient to be convex. 
6 This term is commonly used in commercial real estate markets (Liu, Rosenthal & Strange, 2016). 
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al., 1978). In contrast, Wong et al. (2011) find no evidence of relative level premium in 
Hong Kong.  
The view is another critical factor in MRMs. The literature has investigated a 
variety of views. Positive correlations with housing prices have been found for the views 
of mountains, parks, gardens, and the sea (Bao & Wan, 2004; Wong et al., 2002; Wong et 
al., 2011; Yu et al., 2007); while negative ones for the views of graveyards, roads, and mass 
transit railway stations (Wong et al., 2002; Wong et al., 2011).  
Facing south might be crucial in many regions. For example, a general belief of 
Chinese people is that housing units facing south have the best “fung-shui” (Wong et al., 
2002). Generally, for cities in the Northern Hemisphere, windows facing south bring in 
light and warmth, which are influential on the housing choice and price.  
In general, many structural factors are significantly affecting housing prices. 
However, expect for views and south facing windows, most attributes have controversial 
effects and their expected signs depend on model specifications and empirical contexts. 
Additionally, most estimates are obtained by using both vertical and horizontal variations 
and thus might be biased due to the locational unobserved effects. Robust evidence from 
more areas are needed for this strand of literature. 
1.2.2 Temporal Factors in MRMs 
Many hedonic analyses on MRMs choose cross-sectional data in one year (e.g., Jim & 
Chen, 2009, 2010; Kanemoto & Nakamura, 1986) to keep a balance between a sufficient 
sample size and minimal temporal disturbance. A few use an extended period to build price 
indices with time dummies (Mason & Quigley, 1996). Constructing price indices has been 
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a primary motivation for hedonic modelling (Sheppard, 1999). The simplest practice is to 
estimate the regression coefficients of time dummy variables in a hedonic housing price 
model. In contrast to the repeated sales method (Bailey, Muth, & Nourse, 1963), which 
uses dwelling units that have been transacted more than once, hedonic methods are 
supported for the larger sample size but criticized for potential measurement errors and 
omitted variable issues (Meese & Wallace, 1997). In this sense, using vertical information 
is a balance between sample size and endogeneity issue. One may view housing 
transactions in one building as the building’s repeated sales.  
1.2.3 Study and Practice in Beijing 
Following the horizontal tradition, most hedonic housing price studies in Beijing focus on 
the effects of location factors, such as distance to CBD (Dong, Ding, & Zhao, 2009), ring 
road location (Ma and Li, 2003; Gong, 2009), subway proximity (Dong et al., 2009; Li, 
Yang, Qin, & Chonabayashi, 2016), and school quality (Zheng, Hu, & Wang, 2016). Most 
studies use complex-level data with average prices and exclude the unit-level structural 
attributes from analysis. One exception is the study of the effect of housing sizes on prices 
by Gao and Asami (2011).  Using 279 apartments for sale in the period of one week before 
and after May 1st, 2006 in Beijing, Gao and Asami (2011) classify the continuous housing 
size variable into five categories, estimate the hedonic price for each category, and find 
that housing properties with size 50-60m2 and 80-189m2 have higher prices. Thus, they 
conclude that housing properties within those sizes are valued at a high level than other 
sizes. Their study is inspiring, but the small sample size undermine the validity of their 
results. This paper uses a much larger data set to provide new evidence to this discussion. 
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The price indices for housing markets in Beijing are reported each year in the 
statistical yearbook. These price indices are constructed in a uniformed way in China7. The 
Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Beijing collects a sample of transacted 
housing units from large local housing agencies. Simple average prices are calculated by 
dividing the sum of the total prices by the sum of transacted floor area in the sample. These 
average prices are then used to calculated price indices. The quality of the indices is 
controlled by requiring local agencies to report a comparable and representative sample. 
However, it is unclear about the sample size and the comparability among units. This study 
uses information from the local agency as well but demonstrates a different feasible way 
to obtain temporal variation in housing prices.  
1.2.4 Fixed Effects Models in MRMs Studies 
In the literature, although no studies explicitly aim at explaining the vertical variations, 
some of them essetially do this by applying fixed effects approach using location or 
building dummies (e.g., Chen et al., 2011, Mason & Quigley, 1996; Yu et al., 2007). 
Individual building identifiers are ideal for the vertical investigation. In the literature, a 
dataset of downtown Los Angeles from 1980.01 to 1991.12 contains four high-rise 
buildings’ identifiers and has been used by Quigley (1995) with 463 repeated sales and by 
Mason & Quigley (1996) with 843 all sales. More commonly, identifiers refer to larger 
spatial units such as blocks, projects, and estates, containing one or more adjacent high-
rise structures. For example, Yu et al. (2007) use a dataset of 841 sales in 10 residential 
projects in Singapore during 1995.01 and 2003.07; Chen et al. (2011) use 10,252 sales in 
                                                 
7 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgz/tzgb/201102/t20110216_57581.html 
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16 projects in Shenzhen, China from 2004.08 to 2006.01. Many studies have documented 
a significant increase in estimation performance after including building or location 
dummy variables (e.g., Quigley, 1995; Xu, 2008).  
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
Following the hedonic housing price model (Can, 1992; Rosen, 1974; Goodman, 1978) 
and assuming a linear form, for each 𝑖 at location 𝑙,  
𝑦𝑙𝑖 = 𝒙𝑙𝑖
′ 𝜷 + 𝒛𝑙
′𝜸 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜀𝑙𝑖,         for 𝑙 = 1,… ,𝑀; 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑙             (1.1) 
where 𝑦𝑙𝑖 is the price of housing unit 𝑖 at location 𝑙; 𝒙𝑙𝑖 is a 𝑘 × 1 column vector of observed 
housing characteristics which vary across locations and units at one location; 𝒛𝑙 is a 𝑔 × 1 
column vector of observed housing characteristics which vary across locations but 
invariant across units at each location; 𝜷 and 𝜸 are 𝑘 × 1 and 𝑔 × 1 column vectors of 
coefficients associated with 𝒙 and 𝒛; 𝛼𝑙 includes the unobserved location-specific 
characteristics; 𝜀𝑙𝑖 is the independent error term; 𝑀 is the number of locations and 𝑁𝑙 is the 
number of observations at location 𝑙.  
1.3.1 Least Nugget Effect Estimator (LNE) 
A variogram shows the variance of value differences between all pairs of observations with 
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 distant apart, 
2γ(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗) = v𝑎𝑟 (𝑍(𝑠𝑖) − 𝑍(𝑠𝑗)) ,    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗) ∈ 𝐷                        (1.2) 
where 𝑍(𝑠) is a regionalized variable, a function of locations. γ is called a semivariogram 
(Cressie, 1993). As (𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗) → 0, 𝛾(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗) is expected to be zero. If one observes 
𝛾(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗) → 𝑐0 > 0 as (𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗) → 0, then 𝑐0 is called the “nugget effect” (Matheron, 
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1963). Cressie(1993) argues that a non-zero nugget effect includes the variance of a white-
noise microscale process and the variance of a measurement error. This original definition 
of the nugget effect restricts the regional variables to take only one value at each location.  
Inspired by this concept, if multiple values at each point are allowed in the space, 
the vertical variation in housing prices can be measured as the semivariogram at a distance 
zero. In the following, I call this “nugget effect of housing prices”. For all pairs of 
observations at the same location, 
𝑁𝐸 = γ(0) =
1
2
v𝑎𝑟(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗),  
for {(𝑖, 𝑗)|𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑗  are variables at the same location}. Assuming a constant 
mean at each location, the nugget effect is calculated as 𝑁𝐸 =
1
2
𝐸(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
 . The 
empirical nugget effect can be estimated as 
𝑁?̂? = 𝛾(0) =
1
2|𝐷|
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
𝐷 ,                                        (1.3) 
where 𝐷 ≡ {(𝑖, 𝑗)|𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗  at the same location}, and |𝐷| is the number of pairs.  
For the original model in (1.1), 𝑦𝑙𝑖 = 𝒙𝑙𝑖𝜷 + 𝒛𝑙𝜸 + 𝛼𝑙 + 𝜀𝑙𝑖, I apply the nugget 
effect to the loss function of estimation: instead of minimizing the overall sum of squared 
residuals, this paper minimizes the nugget effect of residuals (𝑒𝑙𝑖). This leads to a least 
nugget effect estimator (LNE): 
?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 ≡ argmin
𝜷
𝑁?̂?(𝜷) = argmin
𝜷
1
2|𝐷|
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑙
𝑀
𝑙=1 .                    (1.4)  
where 𝑒𝑙𝑖 = 𝑦𝑙𝑖 − ?̂?𝑙𝑖 = 𝑦𝑙𝑖 − 𝒙𝑙𝑖
′?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 − 𝛼𝑙; 𝐷𝑙 ≡ {(𝑖, 𝑗)|𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑖, 𝑗 at the location 𝑙}. 
1.3.2 Equivalency between LNE and Pairwise Differences Estimators (PD)  
As shown in Chapter 2, a pairwise differences estimator (PD) is derived by pair-wisely 
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differencing observations in each group to eliminate the location fixed effects 𝛼𝑙.  
The original model (1.1) becomes 
𝑦𝑙𝑖 − 𝑦𝑙𝑗 = (𝒙𝑙𝑖 − 𝒙𝑙𝑗)
′
𝜷 + (𝜀𝑙𝑖 − 𝜀𝑙𝑗).                               (1.5) 
Then, PD is defined as the OLS estimator of (1.5)  
?̂?𝑃𝐷 ≡ argmin
𝜷
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑙𝑀 .                                  (1.6) 
From (1.4) and (1.6), it is easy to see the equivalency between LNE and PD 
?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 ≡ argmin
𝜷
1
2|𝐷|
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑙
𝑀
𝑙=1 = argmin
𝜷
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑙𝑀 ≡ ?̂?𝑃𝐷. 
1.3.3 PD Generalizes Fixed Effects Estimator (FE) 
LNE and PD are not easy to compute directly, and their relationships with the conventional 
fixed effects estimators (FE) are not apparent. Using the algebraic relationship between the 
sum of the squared differences and the sum of the squared deviations from the means (see 
Appendix B for details), 
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑙𝑀 = ∑ 𝑁𝑙 ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒?̅?)
2
𝑁𝑙𝑀  ,                          (1.7) 
where 𝑒?̅? =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙 = 𝑦?̅? − 𝒙?̅?
′?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 − 𝛼𝑙 
8 with 𝑦?̅? =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙  and 𝒙?̅? =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝒙𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙 . 
Put (1.7) into (1.4) and (1.6), LNE and PD can be rewritten as 
?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 = ?̂?𝑃𝐷 = argmin
𝜷
∑ 𝑁𝑙 ∑ (𝑒𝑙𝑖 − 𝑒?̅?)
2
𝑁𝑙𝑀 .                           (1.8) 
The first order condition yields 
?̂?𝐿𝑁𝐸 = ?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ 𝑁𝑙 ∑ ?̃?𝑙𝑖?̃?𝑙𝑖
′]𝑁𝑙𝑀
−1
∑ 𝑁𝑙 ∑ ?̃?𝑙𝑖?̃?𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙𝑀 , 
                                                 
8 𝑒?̅? =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙 =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ (𝑦𝑙𝑖 − 𝒙𝑙𝑖
′?̂?𝐿𝐿𝑉 − 𝛼𝑙)𝑁𝑙 =
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑁𝑙 − (
1
𝑁𝑙
∑ 𝒙𝑙𝑖
′
𝑁𝑙 ) ?̂?𝐿𝐿𝑉 − 𝛼𝑙 = 𝑦?̅? − 𝒙?̅?
′?̂?𝐿𝐿𝑉 − 𝛼𝑙 
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                                                  = [∑ 𝑁𝑙𝑀 ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑙𝑀 ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙 ,           
where ?̃?𝑙𝑖 = 𝒙𝑙𝑖 − 𝒙?̅?; ?̃?𝑙𝑖 = 𝑦𝑙𝑖 − 𝑦?̅?; ?̃?𝑙 is a 𝑁𝑙 × 𝑘 matrix; and ?̃?𝑙 is a 𝑁𝑙 × 1 column 
vector.  
Recall that the fixed effects estimator (FE) is ?̂?𝐹𝐸 = [∑ ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀 ]
−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀 . Then 
it is easy to see that PD generalizes FE by weighting observations in each group by its 
group size. In another word, PD is simply the FE for √𝑁𝑙𝑦𝑙𝑖 = √𝑁𝑙𝒙𝑙𝑖
′𝜷 + √𝑁𝑙𝛼𝑙 +
√𝑁𝑙𝜀𝑙𝑖. The idea is that PD gives less weight to locations with less observations; while FE 
gives each location the same weight. If every location has the same number of observations 
(i.e., balanced data with equal group size 𝑁/𝑀), then ?̂?𝑃𝐷 can be simplified into ?̂?𝐹𝐸 
   ?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ 𝑁𝑙𝑀 ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑙𝑀 ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙                
             = [∑ (
𝑁
𝑀
)?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀 ]
−1 ∑ (
𝑁
𝑀
)?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀                 
      = [∑ ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀 ]
−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙𝑀  
                                                        = ?̂?𝐹𝐸  . 
As shown in Chapter 2, the balancedness is one of the two equivalence conditions 
for PD and FE. The second one is the equal local estimates of each group [?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙]
−1?̃?𝑙
′?̃?𝑙.  
1.3.4 Application in This Paper 
The least nugget effect estimator (LNE) has an intuitive spatial statistical meaning for 
measuring the vertical variation in housing prices. Comparing its performance to the 
conventional fixed effects estimator (FE) provides instructions for relevant empirical 
works. Since LNE is equivalent to PD, and since PD and FE have been theoretically 
compared in Chapter 2, the performance of LNE in comparison to FE could be expected.  
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First, since the housing transaction dataset in this paper is highly unbalanced, the 
results from LNE and FE are expected to be different.  
Second, since both estimators are unbiased and consistent, their estimates should 
be similar to each other when the sample size is large. The dataset in this paper contains 
over 200,000 transactions. Thus the estimates of LNE and FE are expected to be close to 
each other.  
Third, this paper is using clustered data and cluster-robust standard errors, in which 
cases FE would be more efficient if the number of clusters is large; while LNE would be 
more efficient only when the number of clusters is small (6-10) and the within-cluster 
regressor correlations are very high (shown in Chapter 2). The housing data in this paper 
has more than 4000 clusters (locations/buildings), which should be large enough to show 
FE’s efficiency.  
1.4 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
1.4.1 Study Area  
Beijing is the capital of China and one of the most populated cities in the world9. In 2016, 
Beijing has a permanent population10 of 21,729,000 in 16,807 square kilometers. Abundant 
multi-story buildings and massive transaction volumes in the past decade make Beijing an 
ideal choice to investigate vertical housing markets.  
The housing type in Beijing has experienced a transition from traditional courtyard 
                                                 
9 According to the United Nation’s The World’s Cities in 2016: Data Booklet, Beijing rank 6th among 31 
megacities (i.e., cities with 10 million inhabitants or more).  
10 According to Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2017, the permanent population refers to persons living for 
more than half a year in Beijing. http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/nj/main/2017-tjnj/zk/indexeh.htm. 
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houses (one-story) to mid-rise buildings (3-6 story buildings), and to high-rise buildings (7 
or more story buildings) 11. See Ekblad & Werne (1990) for a review of the history. At the 
end of 1997, the multi-story flats take 80% of all housing types in the housing stock (Wang, 
2001). The abolishment of the subsidized housing allocation system in 1998 transformed 
the housing market in Beijing from a centrally planned system to a free-market one (Fu, 
David, & Zhou, 2000; Jim & Chen, 2007). The subsequent emergence of the commercial 
housing sector led to a large amount of high-rise building construction. In 2015, Beijing 
had 85.2% of the residents living in condominiums of multi-story buildings12.  
The housing market boom in Beijing in the past decade has drawn attentions from 
the world. A growing population together with increasing demand and speculation sent 
housing prices skyrocketing (see Figure 1.1 for resale and new housing price indices and 
population index). This research takes the resale housing market of Beijing as objective 
since compared with the new housing market, the resale one has become the dominant 
market in Beijing since 2008 with larger transaction volume, more even spatial distribution, 
and more accessible data. 
                                                 
11 Some scholars argue the mid-rise buildings are 7–20 stories and the high-rise buildings are more than 
20 stories (Jim & Chen, 2007). 
12 According to a survey conducted by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics and Survey Office of the 
National Bureau of Statistics in Beijing. The survey interviews 2,300 18-70 years old residents by phone in 
2015. Some results are reported in this link 
http://tjj.beijing.gov.cn/zxfb/201601/t20160129_335975.html. 
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Figure 1.1   Resale Housing Price and Population Indices (Year 2007 = 100) 13 
 
1.4.2 Data Source 
Data are obtained from the official website of Lianjia—the largest real estate brokerage 
firm in China and in Beijing. During 2012-1016, Lianjia made 51%-63% of the total 
number of transactions in the resale housing market of Beijing (Figure 1.2), more than three 
times larger than the second largest firm 5i5j. The website (lianjia.com) provides detailed 
listing and historical transaction information. The earliest transaction dates to June 2002. 
Each record contains a unique ID corresponding to a signed contract, which makes it 
trackable and verifiable by the buyer and the seller. This paper uses records from January 
2012 through December 2016 to ensure sufficient sample size in each year. In addition, 
this single-listing data helps to control for brokerage effects and other incentive-related 
effects existing in multiple-listing systems (Ong & Koh, 2000).  
                                                 
13 Data source: From Beijing Statistical Yearbooks and the website of Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 
and Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics (http://tjj.beijing.gov.cn/tjsj/yjdsj/fj_5661/2018/). 
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Figure 1.2   Resale Transaction Volume (Units) and Market Share (%) of Lianjia14 
The biggest challenge of this data is the lack of accurate building identifiers. The 
most detailed identifier corresponds to an area containing one or multiple buildings, which 
could be either a complex or an estate project with clear borders (called “Xiaoqu” in 
Chinese), or a tract of land sharing the same street address (called “Jiedao” in Chinese). 
Although the data set contains building-related variables (e.g., building age, elevator 
accessibility) which could be potentially used to identify different buildings in each area, 
we cannot guarantee those variables are sufficient for all areas. To be rigorous, this paper 
studies the variation in housing prices not only on the vertical dimension (i.e., within one 
building) but also on a small scale of horizontal dimension (i.e., between buildings in one 
area). All available building-related variables are included to control for between-building 
                                                 
14 Data source: Historical data from Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development http://www.bjjs.gov.cn/bjjs/fwgl/fdcjy/fwjy/index.shtml 
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variations.  
The original data set contains 386,790 transaction records from 2012-2016. After 
cleaning the data (such as missing values and outliers; see Appendix A for details), this 
paper keeps 262,533 observations for analysis. All observations in the data set are resale 
commodity housing units, which were built for sale at market prices (Fu et al., 2000). 
Figure 1.3 shows that our sample represents half of the total transactions in Beijing and the 
cleaned sample represents about one third.  
 
Figure 1.3   Population and Sample Sizes 
1.4.3 Variable 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 1.1. The dependent variable is 
unit selling price (per square meter), which is the standard measure of housing prices in 
China15. All prices are in real term in 2009 RMB level. One feature of the Beijing housing 
                                                 
15 See examples in Hong Kong (Bao & Wan, 2004).  
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prices is the concentric pattern. See Figure 1.4-1.8 for the sample distribution across 
locations in Beijing from 2012 to 2016.  
 
Figure 1.4   Beijing Resale Housing Price (2012 Sample) 
 
 
Figure 1.5   Beijing Resale Housing Price (2013 Sample) 
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Figure 1.6   Beijing Resale Housing Price (2014 Sample) 
 
 
Figure 1.7   Beijing Resale Housing Price (2015 Sample) 
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Figure 1.8   Beijing Resale Housing Price (2016 Sample) 
 
The independent variables have four types: structural attributes, building-related 
attributes, time identifiers, and location identifiers.  
Structural attributes contain the number of rooms, including bedrooms (BED), 
living rooms (LIV), and bathrooms (BATH). The signs of the estimated coefficients of 
these rooms are expected to be positive. However, the relationship between bedroom and 
price could be nonlinear. The size of the unit is measured by its floor area (FAREA). The 
sign of FAREA is uncertain from the literature. However, since this paper uses the unit 
price, the sign is more likely to be negative. Due to the data limitation, the floor level 
(FLVL) is in relative levels. There are five categories (1-5) to indicate whether a housing 
unit is located on the ground floor, low level, middle level, high level, or the top floor of a 
building respectively. Exposure to the south (SOUTH) is expected to have a positive effect. 
Averagely, 77% units have at least one window facing south. This percent is significant 
because not only right south but directions like southwest and southeast are also regarded 
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as an exposure to the south. Facing both south and north (SNEXP) is good for ventilation, 
which is considered as a premium in Beijing.  
For building attributes, the total number of floors (TNFL) represents the height of the 
building. The effect of a high building is mixed with unexpected signs. Building types 
(BTYPE) include slab building, tower building and mixed building. Year built (BYEAR) 
is the year in which the building was completed. The age of buildings has a negative 
correlation with housing prices in most studies of MRMs (Mok et al., 1995; Bao & Wan, 
2004; Jim & Chen, 2009; Jim & Chen, 2010; Shimizu et al., 2010). A negative effect but 
positive sign is expected. Elevator (ELEV) equals to one if the building is equipped with 
elevators. The elevator is important for high-rise buildings and thus should be positively 
correlated with prices. Interaction terms should also be considered. Heating system 
(HEAT) is available in the dataset. It equals one if there is a central heating system in the 
building and equals to zero if it is self-heating.  
Table 1.1   Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description 
Unit & 
Type 
Mean St. d. Min Median Max 
Dependent Variable 
      
DTUP Deflated transaction unit 
price*  
RMB/Square 
Meter 
32564.9 14175.3 4954.5 29632.4 123902.29 
Independent Variable 
      
House-specific Structural Attributes 
      
BED Number of bedrooms 
 
1.97 0.71 1 2 5 
LIV Number of living Rooms 
 
1.18 0.50 0 1 2 
BATH Number of bathrooms 
 
1.16 0.38 0 1 3 
FAREA Floor area Square 
Meter 
81.23 31.09 12.96 74.29 356 
FLVL Floor Level; relative 
position in the building: 
1—Ground Floor 
2—Low Position 
3—Middle Position 
4—High Position 
5—Top Floor 
Categorical 
(1-5) 
3.10 1.09 1 3 5 
SOUTH Whether the housing unit Dummy 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 
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is exposed to South: 
0—No 
1—Yes 
SNEXP Whether the housing unit 
is exposed to both North 
and South: 
0—No 
1—Yes 
Dummy 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
Building-related Structural Attributes 
      
TNFL Total number of floors 
 
13.30 7.83 2 11 40 
BTYPE Building type: 
1—Slab Building 
2—Tower Building 
3—Mixed Type 
Categorical 
(1-3) 
1.63 0.78 1 1 3 
BYEAR Year built 
 
1999.37 8.24 1893 2001 2016 
ELEV Whether equipped with 
elevator: 
0—No 
1—Yes 
Dummy 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 
HEAT Heating: 
0—Self Heating 
1—Building Heating 
Dummy 0.85 0.35 0 1 1 
Time Identifiers 
      
TYEAR Transaction year Categorical 
(2012-2016) 
2014.51 1.43 2012 2015 2016 
TMON Transaction month Categorical 
(1-12) 
6.61 3.35 1 7 12 
Location Identifiers 
      
LOC Location Categorical       
*All prices are deflated into real prices in the year 2009 RMB. CPI indices are from China Statistical Yearbook 2011-
2015 and other sources from the government.  
1.4.4 Model Specification 
This paper applies the hedonic price function in a linear semi-log form16: logged housing 
prices as the dependent variable and no transformation for the independent variables. 
Different specifications include different variables.  
Temporal factors are incorporated as dummies of transaction years and months, or 
dummies of year-month interactions. The number of bedrooms is treated as in two ways: 
categorical and continuous. Another categorization is applied to the floor areas. Following 
                                                 
16 This paper tried Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable. However, the likelihood-ratio tests 
cannot reject lamda = 0, i.e., the log specification of the dependent variable. To focus on the comparison of 
FE and LNE, this paper applies the semi-log form for all models. 
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Gao and Asami (2011), this paper splits the floor area into 6 categories: [12, 40), [40, 50), 
[50, 60), [60, 80), [80, 190), and [190, 440). In addition, interactions among floor level, 
elevator, and building height are explored.  
Note that for each model above, both FE and LNE are employed for estimation. 
Following the recommendation of Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge (2015), both FE 
(unweighted) and LNE (weighted) estimates and their cluster-robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are reported. 
1.4.5 Result 
Comparing OLS, FE, and LNE 
In Table 1.2, the left three columns show the comparison between OLS, FE, and LNE. 
Some location variables are added for OLS. FE and LNE have no estimates for these 
location variables but produce consistent estimates for others. Theoretically, FE and LNE 
should produce similar estimates since both are unbiased and consistent; and the cluster-
robust standard errors of FE should be smaller than those of LNE since FE is asymptotically 
more efficient according to Chapter 2. This is exactly the case in Table 1.2. The estimates 
of FE are close to LNE but with smaller standard errors. In contrast, the estimates of OLS 
are very different, suggesting the biasedness from endogeneity issues.  
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Table 1.2   FE and LNE with Different Time Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 OLS FE LNE FE LNE FE LNE FE LNE FE LNE 
BED 0.0149** 0.0286*** 0.0384*** 0.0286*** 0.0381*** 0.0310*** 0.0411*** 0.0281*** 0.0381*** 0.0310*** 0.0408*** 
 (0.00563) (0.00170) (0.00350) (0.00173) (0.00350) (0.00201) (0.00362) (0.00169) (0.00353) (0.00203) (0.00370) 
            
LIV 0.0394*** 0.0158*** 0.0223*** 0.0119*** 0.0186*** -0.0120*** -0.00777 0.0168*** 0.0241*** -0.0141*** -0.00964* 
 (0.00522) (0.00173) (0.00484) (0.00179) (0.00478) (0.00227) (0.00469) (0.00171) (0.00492) (0.00231) (0.00468) 
            
BATH 0.0459*** 0.0124*** 0.0124** 0.0126*** 0.0119** 0.0120*** 0.00759 0.0107*** 0.0102* 0.0124*** 0.00769 
 (0.00778) (0.00235) (0.00445) (0.00241) (0.00450) (0.00298) (0.00426) (0.00234) (0.00451) (0.00302) (0.00432) 
            
FAREA -0.00229*** -0.00266*** -0.00322*** -0.00261*** -0.00316*** -0.00230*** -0.00273*** -0.00266*** -0.00322*** -0.00226*** -0.00269*** 
 (0.000257) (0.0000854) (0.000204) (0.0000861) (0.000199) (0.0000915) (0.000191) (0.0000852) (0.000205) (0.0000923) (0.000192) 
            
SOUTH 0.0421*** 0.0555*** 0.0561*** 0.0568*** 0.0574*** 0.0539*** 0.0560*** 0.0550*** 0.0553*** 0.0541*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00136) (0.00244) (0.00144) (0.00251) (0.00193) (0.00327) (0.00132) (0.00222) (0.00198) (0.00340) 
            
SNEXP -0.00105 0.00660*** 0.00527* 0.00465*** 0.00376 0.000362 -0.00226 0.00766*** 0.00683** -0.000928 -0.00317 
 (0.00386) (0.00126) (0.00244) (0.00134) (0.00250) (0.00181) (0.00326) (0.00121) (0.00232) (0.00186) (0.00329) 
            
TNFL 0.000699 -0.00197*** -0.00245 -0.00192*** -0.00224 -0.00186*** -0.00204 -0.00190*** -0.00244 -0.00185*** -0.00194 
 (0.00101) (0.000510) (0.00133) (0.000491) (0.00126) (0.000510) (0.00123) (0.000520) (0.00137) (0.000506) (0.00121) 
            
BYEAR 0.000833 0.00296*** 0.00375*** 0.00303*** 0.00378*** 0.00356*** 0.00429*** 0.00296*** 0.00378*** 0.00359*** 0.00428*** 
 (0.000637) (0.000238) (0.000435) (0.000234) (0.000403) (0.000279) (0.000438) (0.000238) (0.000463) (0.000284) (0.000460) 
            
ELEV 0.122*** 0.0223*** 0.0226* 0.0220*** 0.0228** 0.0153*** 0.0158* 0.0212*** 0.0221* 0.0154*** 0.0166* 
 (0.0126) (0.00416) (0.00888) (0.00416) (0.00869) (0.00454) (0.00781) (0.00417) (0.00894) (0.00459) (0.00793) 
            
2.FLVL -0.0152*** -0.00833*** -0.00861*** -0.00700*** -0.00672** -0.00954*** -0.00659* -0.00792*** -0.00857*** -0.00961*** -0.00627 
 (0.00266) (0.00152) (0.00250) (0.00160) (0.00252) (0.00221) (0.00332) (0.00145) (0.00245) (0.00223) (0.00335) 
            
3.FLVL -0.00747** 0.00127 0.00282 0.00296 0.00544 -0.000482 0.00373 0.00137 0.00264 -0.000222 0.00488 
 (0.00259) (0.00158) (0.00305) (0.00166) (0.00307) (0.00211) (0.00348) (0.00152) (0.00294) (0.00212) (0.00352) 
            
4.FLVL -0.0188*** -0.00559** -0.00288 -0.00320 0.000459 -0.00709** -0.00232 -0.00560** -0.00334 -0.00648** -0.000879 
 (0.00287) (0.00181) (0.00365) (0.00188) (0.00374) (0.00234) (0.00385) (0.00172) (0.00345) (0.00237) (0.00395) 
            
5.FLVL -0.0570*** -0.0494*** -0.0475*** -0.0456*** -0.0434*** -0.0463*** -0.0428*** -0.0492*** -0.0475*** -0.0442*** -0.0406*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00208) (0.00439) (0.00216) (0.00437) (0.00262) (0.00457) (0.00200) (0.00429) (0.00267) (0.00462) 
            
2.BTYPE -0.104*** -0.0164*** -0.0118 -0.0169*** -0.0142 -0.0215*** -0.0223* -0.0167*** -0.0118 -0.0218*** -0.0239* 
 (0.0135) (0.00432) (0.0110) (0.00431) (0.0105) (0.00487) (0.0108) (0.00437) (0.0112) (0.00491) (0.0108) 
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3.BTYPE -0.0446*** -0.0153*** -0.00960 -0.0163*** -0.0115 -0.0189*** -0.0162* -0.0146*** -0.00853 -0.0191*** -0.0176** 
 (0.0116) (0.00318) (0.00604) (0.00323) (0.00588) (0.00418) (0.00645) (0.00318) (0.00611) (0.00422) (0.00653) 
            
HEAT 0.0521*** -0.00801 -0.00334 -0.00650 -0.00174 -0.00767 -0.0103 -0.00657 -0.000349 -0.00678 -0.00842 
 (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0156) (0.0111) (0.0159) (0.0131) (0.0160) (0.0110) (0.0158) (0.0134) (0.0165) 
            
Locational Yes           
TYEAR? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
TMON? Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes     
TYEAR* 
TMON? 
       Yes Yes   
N 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 
adj. R2 0.755 0.768 0.766 0.673 0.674 0.086 0.089 0.831 0.831 0.029 0.035 
F 1446.4 3375.3 1845.9 3482.1 1765.3 464.5 342.0 2117.5 1805.6 132.7 60.46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Year Dummies 
For the year dummies, all three estimators produce similar results (see Table 1.3 and Figure 
1.9). This is largely because the year factor is relatively independent and immune to the 
endogeneity issues. The year effect on housing prices is very large. Comparing to the year 
2012, transactions in 2013 have on average 30% higher prices. Prices in 2014 fall a little 
bit but are still 27% higher than 2012. Prices in 2015 are at similar level with 2013. In 
2016, the housing price almost doubles the level of 2013.   
Table 1.3   Estimates of Year Dummies 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
LNE 
2013.TYEAR 0.318*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00150) (0.00270) 
    
2014.TYEAR 0.278*** 0.265*** 0.267*** 
 (0.00308) (0.00198) (0.00325) 
    
2015.TYEAR 0.318*** 0.303*** 0.298*** 
 (0.00314) (0.00230) (0.00412) 
    
2016.TYEAR 0.606*** 0.602*** 0.602*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00338) (0.00683) 
    
N 262533 262533 262533 
adj. R2 0.755 0.768 0.766 
F 1446.4 3375.3 1845.9 
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Figure 1.9   Estimates of Year Dummies 
Model (4) to (11) in Table 1.2 use different specification of the time variables. 
Focusing on FE models. When the model excludes all temporal factors as in Model (10), 
only around 2.9% of the price variation is explained, which could be regarded as the 
explanatory power of the structural variables. When adding the month dummies (Model 
6), the ratio increases to 8.6%; the difference 5.7% is the explanatory power of the month 
variable. When only adding the year dummies (Model 4), the ratio becomes 67.3%, which 
indicates a 64.4% of the variation is explained by the year changes. At last, the best model 
seems to be (8) which use the interaction between years and months. Note that the 
parameter estimates are stable across different model specifications.  
Structural and Building Variables 
According to the results of Model (2), for housing-specific variables, one more unit of 
bedrooms (BED), living rooms (LIV), and bathrooms (BATH) are associated with an 
increase in housing price per square meter by 2.86%, 1.58%, and 1.24%, respectively. The 
floor area (FAREA) is negatively associated with housing prices by 0.3%, which is a quite 
small magnitude as compared to other housing attributes and very similar to the findings 
of Mok et al. (1995) in Hong Kong. 
In terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, the exposure to the south (SOUTH) 
is the most influential positive attributes by 5.5%. The effect of being exposed to both south 
and north (SNEXP) is positive but with a smaller value of 0.66%. There is a slight ground 
premium. Compared to the ground floor (FLVL), low-level position corresponds to a price 
depreciation by 0.83%, high position by 0.56%, and the top floor by 4.9%. The effect of 
the middle position is not significantly different from that of the ground floor.  
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For building-specific variables, the total number of floors (TNFL) have a slightly 
negative relationship to housing prices by 0.2%. The built year (BYEAR) effect is positive. 
Housing prices increase by 0.3% if a building is one year newer. Being equipped with 
elevators (ELEV) has a significantly positive effect by 2.2%. For building types (BTYPE), 
the slab building has a larger effect of 1.5% than the tower building and the mixed building. 
The heating type (HEAT) has no significant relationship with housing prices.  
Floor Level, Total Floors, and Elevator 
In Table 1.2, one striking finding is the ground floor premium, which means residents 
prefer the ground floor to all other levels. This is a huge contrast to many MRMs where 
people favor the top floors. This paper further investigates the interaction between floor 
levels, elevators, and total floors.  
Table 1.4 shows the results of FE models with interaction terms. Model (12) 
includes the interaction term between the floor level and the elevator. Model (13) adds the 
total number of floors into the interaction. Most interactive terms have significant 
estimates. Floor level coefficients in different models are summarized in Table 1.5. The 
two columns of Model (12) in Table 1.5 and Figure 1.10 show that the ground premium 
found in model (2) gets larger when the building has no elevator but disappears for the 
buildings with elevators. In the latter case, the high position (not the top floor) is mostly 
favored. The columns of Model (13) and Figure 1.11 show that for buildings without 
elevators, the higher the building is, the less the top floor would be valued. In contrast, the 
low and middle positions are more valued with the building gets higher. For no-elevator 
buildings higher than 9 floors, both low and middle positions of the building are preferred 
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to the ground level. For buildings with elevators, as the total number of floors increases, 
the ground level premium decreases comparing to all other floor levels. When the total 
floor is larger than 13, all other floor levels are preferred to the ground one.  
Analysis with interaction terms tells us that the ground level premium exists in 
Beijing for certain types of buildings. For no-elevator buildings less than 7 floors or with-
elevator buildings less than 10 floors, the ground floor has the highest effects on housing 
prices. The ground level in a higher building is exposed to larger negative externality 
brought by the denser living environment.  
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Table 1.4   FE Models with Interaction Terms 
 (2) (12) (13) 
 FE FE with Interaction FE with Interaction 
TNFL -0.00197*** -0.00195*** -0.00598*** 
 (0.000510) (0.000511) (0.00150) 
    
ELEV 0.0223*** 0.0670*** 0.0188* 
 (0.00416) (0.00458) (0.00924) 
    
2.FLVL -0.00833*** -0.00815*** -0.0551*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00180) (0.00715) 
    
3.FLVL 0.00127 -0.0131*** -0.0432*** 
 (0.00158) (0.00173) (0.00726) 
    
4.FLVL -0.00559** -0.0389*** -0.0403*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00216) (0.00755) 
    
5.FLVL -0.0494*** -0.0786*** -0.0426*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00225) (0.00832) 
    
1.ELEV * 1.FLVL  -0.0967***  
  (0.00350)  
    
1.ELEV * 2.FLVL  -0.0684***  
  (0.00254)  
    
1.ELEV * 3.FLVL  -0.0493***  
  (0.00234)  
    
1.ELEV * 4.FLVL  -0.0207***  
  (0.00242)  
    
0.ELEV * 2.FLVL * TNFL   0.00776*** 
   (0.00120) 
    
0.ELEV * 3.FLVL * TNFL   0.00523*** 
   (0.00123) 
    
0.ELEV * 4.FLVL * TNFL   0.000558 
   (0.00131) 
    
0.ELEV * 5.FLVL * TNFL   -0.00594*** 
   (0.00145) 
    
1.ELEV * 2.FLVL* TNFL   0.00424** 
   (0.00156) 
    
1.ELEV * 3.FLVL * TNFL   0.00436** 
   (0.00156) 
    
1.ELEV * 4.FLVL * TNFL   0.00432** 
   (0.00155) 
    
1.ELEV * 5.FLVL * TNFL   0.00330* 
   (0.00156) 
N 262533 262533 262533 
adj. R2 0.768 0.771 0.771 
F 3375.3 3090.8 2812.4 
       ** Other variables are those in Table 1.2. The interaction models have very similar estimates for them. 
       Standard errors in parentheses         * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 1.5   Interaction among Floor Level, Elevator, and Total Floor 
 (2) (12) (12) (13) (13) 
Variable FE No Elevator Elevator No Elevator Elevator 
Ground Floor 0 0 0 0 0 
      
Low Position -0.00833 -0.00815 0.0201 -0.0551 + 0.00776 * TNFL -0.0551 + 0.00424 * TNFL 
      
Middle Position Not significant -0.0131 0.0343 -0.0432 + 0.00523 * TNFL -0.0432 + 0.00436 * TNFL 
      
High Position -0.00559 -0.0389 0.0371 - 0.0403 -0.0403 + 0.00432 * TNFL 
      
Top Floor -0.0494 -0.0786 0.0181 -0.0426 - 0.00594 * TNFL -0.0426 + 0.00330 * TNFL 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.10  Vertical Gradient (with and without Elevator)
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Figure 1.11  Vertical Gradient (with Elevator and Total Floors from 5 to 15) 
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Categorical Bedroom Numbers and Floor Areas 
Lastly, this paper specifies the number of bedrooms as dummy variables and the floor area 
as a categorical variable. In Table 1.6, Model (2) is listed as a benchmark. Model (14) uses 
bedroom dummies, model (15) uses floor area categories, model (16) includes both, and 
model (17) excludes the variable of the bedroom from the regression. First, all other 
variables, except for other room numbers and the elevator, have stable parameter estimates 
across all specifications. Second, comparing model (14) and (16), the estimates of the 
bedroom dummies are inconsistent17.  Without controlling for floor area categories (model 
14), the 1-bedroom house is least favorable, and the 4-bedroom house has the largest effect 
on prices; while controlling for the floor area categories (model 16), the 2-bedroom house 
is the favorite, and houses with more bedrooms are less favored. Similar inconsistency can 
be found in models (2) and (15); the estimate of the original bedroom variable is affected 
and changes from positive to negative. In contrast, the floor area categories have more 
stable estimates. In model (17), when the variable of the bedroom is excluded from the 
regression, the results are still similar. Different from the findings from Gao and Asami 
(2011), who argues that [50, 60) and [80, 190) are more highly valued, this paper shows 
the smaller sizes are preferred.  
 
  
                                                 
17 This suggests a strong correlation between the number of bedroom and the floor area, which is in fact 
0.7052.  
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Table 1.6    Bedroom Dummies and Floor Area Categories 
 (2) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
 
FE Bed_D FAREA_C 
Bed_D + 
FAREA_C 
FAREA_C 
No Bed 
BED 0.0286***  -0.00211   
 (0.00170)  (0.00150)   
      
2.BED  0.0372***  0.0282***  
  (0.00235)  (0.00202)  
      
3.BED  0.0574***  0.0122***  
  (0.00338)  (0.00283)  
      
4.BED  0.0856***  -0.0272***  
  (0.00671)  (0.00617)  
      
5.BED  0.0631***  -0.0911***  
  (0.0189)  (0.0202)  
      
FAREA -0.00266*** -0.00267***    
 (0.0000854) (0.0000849)    
      
[40, 50)   -0.0534*** -0.0557*** -0.0536*** 
   (0.00468) (0.00449) (0.00465) 
      
[50, 60)   -0.0761*** -0.0915*** -0.0772*** 
   (0.00501) (0.00490) (0.00479) 
      
[60, 80)   -0.0940*** -0.115*** -0.0959*** 
   (0.00544) (0.00534) (0.00500) 
      
[80, 190)   -0.128*** -0.158*** -0.131*** 
   (0.00640) (0.00625) (0.00555) 
      
[190, 440)   -0.207*** -0.211*** -0.212*** 
   (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0123) 
      
LIV 0.0158*** 0.0146*** 0.00379* 0.00320 0.00379* 
 (0.00173) (0.00168) (0.00178) (0.00175) (0.00178) 
      
BATH 0.0124*** 0.0166*** -0.0430*** -0.0355*** -0.0443*** 
 (0.00235) (0.00223) (0.00286) (0.00272) (0.00311) 
      
SOUTH 0.0555*** 0.0547*** 0.0508*** 0.0495*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00145) (0.00141) (0.00144) 
      
SNEXP 0.00660*** 0.00594*** 0.00646*** 0.00570*** 0.00605*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00133) (0.00130) (0.00132) 
      
TNFL -0.00197*** -0.00198*** -0.00222*** -0.00220*** -0.00223*** 
 (0.000510) (0.000508) (0.000537) (0.000530) (0.000537) 
      
BYEAR 0.00296*** 0.00298*** 0.00218*** 0.00247*** 0.00222*** 
 (0.000238) (0.000238) (0.000237) (0.000236) (0.000236) 
      
ELEV 0.0223*** 0.0228*** 0.0106* 0.0129** 0.0108* 
 (0.00416) (0.00414) (0.00458) (0.00441) (0.00457) 
      
2.FLVL -0.00833*** -0.00841*** -0.00906*** -0.00893*** -0.00902*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00155) 
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3.FLVL 0.00127 0.00117 0.000229 0.000341 0.000281 
 (0.00158) (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00162) 
      
4.FLVL -0.00559** -0.00563** -0.00651*** -0.00615*** -0.00648*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00185) 
      
5.FLVL -0.0494*** -0.0493*** -0.0500*** -0.0494*** -0.0500*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00207) (0.00223) (0.00220) (0.00223) 
      
2.BTYPE -0.0164*** -0.0167*** -0.00915 -0.00956* -0.00921 
 (0.00432) (0.00432) (0.00471) (0.00465) (0.00471) 
      
3.BTYPE -0.0153*** -0.0153*** -0.0110** -0.0110** -0.0110** 
 (0.00318) (0.00318) (0.00344) (0.00338) 
 
(0.00344) 
2013.TYEAR 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00151) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152) 
      
2014.TYEAR 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 
 (0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00198) 
      
2015.TYEAR 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.302*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00231) 
      
2016.TYEAR 0.602*** 0.602*** 0.601*** 0.600*** 0.601*** 
 (0.00338) (0.00338) (0.00339) (0.00338) (0.00339) 
      
N 262533 262533 262533 262533 262533 
adj. R2 0.768 0.769 0.758 0.760 0.758 
F 3375.3 3098.9 2930.7 2774.7 3016.1 
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1.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
This paper aims to explain the vertical variation in housing prices. The contribution of this 
paper is two-fold: empirical evidence and methodological exploration. 
Empirically, this paper uses a large dataset of resale housing transaction records in 
Beijing from 2012 to 2016 and shows that temporal factors and the structural attributes 
together account for around 76% of the variation in housing prices. The structural attributes 
only account for about 3% of the variation; while the temporal factors, years and months, 
explain the rest 73%. The most important structural factor in Beijing is the exposure to the 
south, leading to around 5% increase in housing prices. Beijing features a ground floor 
premium, which is conditional on the building’s total number of floors and whether has an 
elevator. The floor areas are examined in both continuous and categorical terms. This small 
size preference contradicts the existing findings of Beijing housing markets in the 
literature.  
Methodologically, this paper develops a least nugget effect estimator (LNE) which is 
equivalent to the pairwise differences estimator (PD) and generalizes the fixed effects 
estimator (FE) by weighting group sizes. This paper provides empirical evidence for the 
efficiency of FE over PD (and thus LNE) given large samples.  
There are two limitations of this paper. The first is the assumption that there are no 
spatial and temporal dependencies of housing prices. This paper controls the within-group 
correlation by applying cluster-robust standard errors but at the same time assumes no 
between-group or inter-temporal dependencies. This may not be valid in housing markets 
where spatial and temporal autocorrelations widely exist. The fixed effects estimator has 
also been criticized for not fully controlling for spatial dependency (Anselin & Arribas-
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Bel, 2013). Scholars have taken both spatial and temporal dependencies into consideration 
to control for the spatio-temporal autocorrelation effects in MRMs (Sun et al., 2005). The 
assumption may potentially bias the standard errors and the inference of the parameter 
estimates. The second limitation is to assume that the numbers of observations at each 
location are exogenous. This may not be valid since the unobservable characteristics of 
houses sold frequently could differ from those sold infrequently (Englund, Quigley, & 
Redfearn, 1999). The resultant selection bias might undermine the findings of this paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES ESTIMATORS IN LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS MODELS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies with clustered data commonly apply linear fixed effects models which 
assume that the unobserved cluster effects may be correlated with regressors. Under this 
favorable assumption, a fixed effects estimator (hereafter FE) is the default choice for 
estimation due to its consistency achieved by eliminating the unobserved cluster effects via 
mean-differencing transformation. In the econometric literature, there are two other 
estimators applying this “elimination-by-transformation” strategy but with different 
transformation approaches (other than mean-differencing): one is the first differences 
estimator (hereafter FD), transforming the data by taking successive differences for 
individual time series (Wooldridge, 2010); the other is called pairwise differences 
estimator (hereafter PD18), which transforms the data by differencing all pairs of 
observations in each group (Honoré & Powell, 1997). FD has been intensively studied as 
an alternative to FE in a panel setting, yet it cannot be directly applied to clustered data 
since within-cluster observations seldom have any orderings. In contrast, PD seems to be 
a feasible alternative to FE in a clustered setting, however, its property and comparison 
with FE are still understudied. This paper fills this gap by exploring the properties of PD 
and its relationship with FE in linear fixed effects models.  
The pairwise differences estimator (PD) features “pairwise-differencing” or 
                                                 
18 In this paper, the abbreviations FE and PD only refer to the least squared estimators in linear fixed 
effects models under corresponding transformations (mean-differencing and pairwise differencing).  
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“pairwise comparing” approach, which has been studied in the literature of statistics and 
econometrics. In statistics, this approach was discussed as an alternative to mean-
differencing. Von Neumann, Kent, Bellinson, & Hart (1941) cited that the sum of the 
squared pairwise differences and the sum of the squared deviations from the mean generate 
the same estimate for data without group structures. The widely applied spatial statistics 
variogram and semivariogram (Matheron, 1963; Cressie, 1993) are also based on pairwise 
comparing the observations. In econometrics, this approach has been applied in the fields 
of robust estimation (Stromberg, Hössjer, & Hawkins, 2000; Baltagi & Bresson, 2015), 
truncated and censored regressions (Honoré, 1992; Honoré & Powell, 1994) and nonlinear 
models (Honoré & Powell, 1997).  
In the context of linear fixed effects models, this pairwise differencing approach 
was firstly described in Honoré and Powell (1997) without further discussion; and it was 
not until Aquaro and Čížek (2013) that an estimation using PD was documented. Aquaro 
and Čížek (2013) compared the Monte Carlo performance of the least squared estimator 
and some robust estimators under mean-differencing and pairwise-differencing 
transformations. Their results showed the advantage of applying pairwise differencing 
transformation to robust estimators. However, for the least squared estimators of two 
transformations (i.e. FE and PD)—which are the focus of this paper, their simulation 
produced exact same results in both estimation and inference using original data, and only 
slight differences after adding some outliers.  
This paper will show that this equivalency between FE and PD are essentially due 
to the balancedness of the panel data used by Aquaro and Čížek (2013), i.e. the number of 
observations for each cluster (or individual in panel) is the same. Adding outliers unevenly 
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made the data slightly unbalanced, and thus led to the slight differences in the results. A 
main finding of this paper is that PD generalizes FE by weighting each observation by its 
cluster size, making the balancedness a necessary condition for the equivalency between 
PD and FE. Another necessary condition is also identified—inspired by the concept of 
mediant and weighted mediant in the number theory, that is, equal local estimates for each 
cluster. If the local OLS estimates for each cluster are the same, the global FE and PD 
estimates would be equal even under severe unbalancedness.  
In clustered data, these two necessary conditions (unequal cluster sizes and unequal 
local estimates) are commonly satisfied, and thus FE and PD always perform differently. 
One (and, as far as I know, the only one) example is provided by Desai and Begg (2008). 
They compared FE and PD in studying the association between children’s head 
circumference at birth and intelligence at age 7 years. Differences between FE and PD were 
documented: the estimate by FE is 1.18 with 95% confidence interval (0.96, 1.4) and the 
corresponding by PD is 0.69 with (0.41, 0.97). Their data is unbalanced (although slightly), 
containing 9147 children observations clustered in 4170 families and at least 2 children per 
family. In addition, the smaller confidence interval of FE suggests its efficiency over PD. 
It is worth mentioning that the number of clusters in their study is large (e.g. 4170 families) 
relative to cluster sizes (e.g. 2 or more children), which is not always the case for many 
clustered data studies, for example a study with unequal number of counties (over 
hundreds) clustered in a few states (less than 50). This paper will conduct Monte Carlo 
simulation and compare the performance of FE and PD in different cluster structures, 
including different numbers of clusters and levels of unbalancedness.  
As shown later in this paper, since the asymptotic variance matrices of FE and PD 
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are hard to compare, this paper conducts Monte Carlo simulation to examine their 
performance in efficiency. The simulation employs two common variance estimators: the 
default i.i.d. standard errors and the cluster-robust standard errors (CRVE19). However, 
these two estimators are known to be downward biased and lead to over-rejection in certain 
situations: for example, the i.i.d. standard error is downward biased when the errors are not 
i.i.d.; and the CRVE over-rejects when the number of clusters is small (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Cameron et al., 2008; MacKinnon & Webb, 2017; Wooldridge, 2003), 
both of which are cases of my interest. Thus, rejection rates are additionally reported to 
validate the findings of PD and FE.  
Based on 10,000 simulations, the paper shows that: 1) PD and FE provide similarly 
accurate estimates, which is as expected since both of them are unbiased and consistent; 2) 
When the number of clusters is large, FE is a more efficient choice than PD in terms of 
smaller CRVE; 3) Although PD generates smaller CRVE when the number of clusters is 
small (less than 10), in most cases, the over-rejection issue of CRVE undermines its 
validity; 4) PD could provide valid efficiency improvement over FE: by 1.7%-9.4% in 
CRVE when using heteroscedastic clustered data with few clusters (6 to 10) and with very 
high within-cluster correlation of regressors;  by 1%-5% in default i.i.d. standard errors 
when using homoscedastic panel data with zero or very high within-cluster error 
correlations.  
In addition to the investigation of PD as an alternative to FE, this paper contributes 
to the literature in two other aspects. First, I introduce the mediant and weighted mediant 
                                                 
19 CRVE represents cluster-robust variance estimate. This paper uses CRVE to denote the cluster-robust 
standard errors following the practice of Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller (2008).  
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to explain the estimators’ relationship. This pair of concepts provide a new perspective to 
view the relationship between local and global estimates: the global estimate is a mediant 
of local estimates. Second, the fact that PD is a weighted version of FE provides another 
answer to the question of Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge (2015)—“What are we weighting 
for?”: weighting by cluster sizes to individual data and then applying fixed effects 
estimation is equivalent to pairwise comparing within-group individuals. In what follows, 
Section 2 introduces PD and its properties, Section 3 compares PD and FE from the 
perspective of the mediant theory, Section 4 conducts Monte Carlo simulation and 
summarizes the results, and Section 5 discusses and concludes with key findings. 
2.2 PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR 
2.2.1 Model and Estimator 
The linear model to be estimated is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝒙𝑖𝑔
′𝜷 + 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔          for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑔; 𝑔 = 1, … , 𝐺                     (2.1) 
where 𝑔 indexes the clusters and 𝑖 indexes observations in each cluster; 𝐺 is the number of 
clusters, 𝑁𝑔 is the cluster size, and thus the total number of observation is 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔  ;  𝒙𝑖𝑔 
is a 1 × 𝑘 column vector of explanatory variables that vary within cluster; 𝜷 is a 𝑘 × 1 
column vector of parameters; 𝛼𝑔 is the unobserved cluster effect and may correlate with 
𝒙𝑖𝑔; and 𝜀𝑖𝑔 is the idiosyncratic error term.  
Transform (2.1) by taking pairwise differences within each cluster 𝑔 to eliminate 
the unobserved cluster effect 𝛼𝑔: 
𝑦
𝑖𝑔
− 𝑦
𝑗𝑔
= (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
𝜷 + (𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀𝑗𝑔).                                  (2.2) 
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For each cluster 𝑔, the set of all pairs of observations 𝑃𝑔 is defined as 
𝑃𝑔 ≡ {(𝑖, 𝑗)|𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑖, 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑔}, 
and the number of pairs is |𝑃𝑔| = 𝑁𝑔(𝑁𝑔 − 1)/2. Thus, the total number of pairs in the 
sample is,  
|𝑃| = ∑ |𝑃𝑔|
𝐺
𝑔=1 = ∑ 𝑁𝑔(𝑁𝑔 − 1)/2
𝐺
𝑔=1 .                                 (2.3) 
The pairwise differences estimator (PD) is defined as the OLS estimator of (2.2), 
i.e.  
          ?̂?𝑃𝐷 ≡ argmin
𝜷
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑔 − 𝑒𝑗𝑔)
2
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 ,                              (2.4) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑔 = 𝑦𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑖𝑔
′?̂?𝑃𝐷 − 𝛼𝑔 and 𝑒𝑖𝑔 − 𝑒𝑗𝑔 = (𝑦𝑖𝑔 − 𝑦𝑗𝑔) − (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
?̂?𝑃𝐷. This is 
first proposed by Honoré and Powell (1994) as a special case when there is neither 
censoring nor truncation and the loss function is in squared form. The first-order condition 
yields:  
?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 ]
−1
∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)(𝑦𝑖𝑔 − 𝑦𝑗𝑔)(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 . (2.5) 
The PD estimator is unbiased under the exogeneity condition, i.e. 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀𝑗𝑔|𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔] = 0, which is the same for FE estimator: 
𝐸(?̂?𝑃𝐷|𝑿) = 𝐸 {[∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
𝑃𝑔𝑔 ]
−1
[∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑦𝑖𝑔 − 𝑦𝑗𝑔)] |𝑿}  
                  = 𝜷 + 𝐸 {[∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
𝑃𝑔𝑔 ]
−1
[∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀𝑗𝑔)] |𝑿}  
    = 𝜷 + [∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)
′
𝑃𝑔𝑔 ]
−1
∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)𝑃𝑔𝑔 𝐸[(𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀𝑗𝑔)|𝑿]  
The PD estimator is consistent if  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚|𝑃|−1 ∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − 𝒙𝑗𝑔)𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀𝑗𝑔) = 0, which 
happens if |𝑃| → ∞ and the exogeneity condition holds.  
 55 
2.2.2 PD Generalizes FE 
Recall that a fixed effects estimator (FE) is defined as the OLS estimator of the mean-
differenced model 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔 = (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
′
𝜷 + (𝜀𝑖𝑔 − 𝜀?̅?), 
?̂?𝐹𝐸 ≡ argmin
𝜷
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
2𝑁𝑔
𝑖=1
𝐺
𝑔=1 ,                                  (2.6) 
?̂?𝐹𝐸 = [∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
′
𝑖𝑔 ]
−1
∑ ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)(𝑦𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)𝑖𝑔 ,  
where ?̅?𝑔 =
1
𝑁𝑔
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 = ?̅?𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔
′?̂?𝑃𝐷 − 𝛼𝑔 with ?̅?𝑔 =
1
𝑁𝑔
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑖  and ?̅?𝑔 =
1
𝑁𝑔
∑ 𝒙𝑖𝑔𝑖 . 
Using the algebraic relationship between the sum squared differences and the sum 
squared deviations from means (see Appendix B), it can be shown that the loss function of 
PD in (2.4) is equivalent to a 𝑁𝑔-weighted version of the loss function of FE in (2.6): 
∑ ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑔 − 𝑒𝑗𝑔)
2
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 = ∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ (𝑒𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
2𝑁𝑔
𝑖=1
𝐺
𝑔=1  ,                    (2.7) 
Thus, ?̂?𝑃𝐷 in (2.5) can be rewritten as 
         ?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)(𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
′
𝑖𝑔 ]
−1
∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ (𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)(𝑦𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)𝑖𝑔   
                 = [∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑔?̃?𝑖𝑔
′]𝑖𝑔
−1
∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑔?̃?𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑔                                                                      
                 = [∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔 ,              
where 𝒙𝑖𝑔 = 𝒙𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔; ?̃?𝑖𝑔 = 𝑦𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔; ?̃?𝑔 is a 𝑁𝑔 × 𝑘 matrix; and ?̃?𝑔 is a 𝑁𝑔 × 1 column 
vector.  
Hence, PD generalizes FE by weighting each observation by its cluster size. The 
intuition is that a larger weight is given to the observations in a larger cluster, in contrast 
to FE which gives each cluster the same weight. If cluster size 𝑁𝑔 is the same (i.e. equal 
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cluster size 𝑁𝑔 = 𝑁/𝐺), then ?̂?𝑃𝐷 can be simplified into ?̂?𝐹𝐸: 
                                                  ?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔  
                                                          = [∑ (
𝑁
𝐺
)?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔 ]
−1 ∑ (
𝑁
𝐺
)?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔   
                                                          = [∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔 ]
−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔  
                                                          = ?̂?𝐹𝐸 . 
From the perspective of weighted least squared estimation, PD is simply the FE 
for √𝑁𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑔 = √𝑁𝑔𝒙𝑖𝑔
′𝜷 + √𝑁𝑔𝛼𝑔 + √𝑁𝑔𝜀𝑖𝑔.  
2.2.3 Variance-Covariance Matrix Estimation 
To control both within-cluster correlation and heteroscedasticity (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005; Cameron & Miller, 2015), the cluster-robust estimate of the variance matrix (CRVE) 
is widely used. Assuming error independence across clusters, the CRVEs for FE has been 
shown as the “sandwich” estimate (Cameron & Miller, 2015): 
?̂?(?̂?𝐹𝐸) = [∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 ]
−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑔?̂?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 [∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 ]
−1,                                (2.8) 
where ?̂?𝑔 = ?̃?𝑔 − ?̃?𝑔?̂?𝐹𝐸. For PD, the sandwich CRVE can be derived as  
     ?̂?(?̂?𝑃𝐷) = [∑ 𝑁𝑔?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 ]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑔
2?̃?𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑔?̂?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 [∑ 𝑁𝑔?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝐺 ]
−1,                     (2.9) 
where  ?̂?𝑔 = ?̃?𝑔 − ?̃?𝑔?̂?𝑃𝐷. Compared to (2.8), 𝑁𝑔 appears in three places of (2.9), making 
it infeasible to compare 𝑉(?̂?𝐹𝐸)and 𝑉(?̂?𝑃𝐷) mathematically. In another word, PD does not 
necessarily increase the efficiency of FE. It depends on three quantities related to cluster 
heterogeneity (Carter, Schnepel, & Steigerwald, 2017): (1) cluster sizes; (2) the cluster 
specific error covariance matrix; and (3) the observed value of the regressors.  
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2.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN FE AND PD ESTIMATOR 
?̂?𝐹𝐸 = [∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔 ]
−1 ∑ ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔𝑔 ; 
?̂?𝑃𝐷 = [∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔]
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔, 
Looking at the formulae of FE and PD, ?̂?𝑃𝐷 imposes density weights 𝑁𝑔 to both ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔 
(matrix denominator) and ?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔 (matrix numerator) of ?̂?𝐹𝐸 for each cluster 𝑔. The inverse 
operation makes it hard to see how the weighting practice deviates ?̂?𝑃𝐷 from  ?̂?𝐹𝐸. 
This section discusses the two equivalence conditions between FE and PD, and how 
PD deviates from FE as the conditions are relaxed. The discussion is inspired by a pair of 
mathematical concepts—mediant and weighted mediant, which are analogous to FE and 
PD in the number theory. This pair of concepts is introduced in the following section.  
2.3.1 Mediant and Weighted Mediant 
A mediant 𝑚 for a sequence of 𝑛 fractions 
𝑎1
𝑏1
,
𝑎2
𝑏2
, … ,
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛
 is defined as 
𝑚 =
𝑎1+𝑎2+⋯+𝑎𝑛
𝑏1+𝑏2+⋯+𝑏𝑛
= (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,      for  𝑖 = 1…𝑛, 
where 𝑎𝑖 is a nonnegative real number, and 𝑏𝑖 a is positive real number. If 𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛 
are 𝑛 positive real numbers, then a weighted median is defined as  
𝑚𝑤 =
𝑤1𝑎1+𝑤2𝑎2+⋯+𝑤𝑛𝑎𝑛
𝑤1𝑏1+𝑤2𝑏2+⋯+𝑤𝑛𝑏𝑛
= (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,        for  𝑖 = 1…𝑛. 
It is interesting to see that ?̂?𝐹𝐸 and  ?̂?𝑃𝐷 can be viewed as, in matrix form, the 
mediant and the weighted mediant of the sequence of [?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔]
−1?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔. Unfortunately, the 
literature of the mediant is based on numbers, not vectors or matrices. To avoid groundless 
application of the mediant theory to the comparison between FE and PD, this paper chooses 
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relevant theories and then conducts Monte Carlo simulation to verify their applicability to 
the matrix setting.  
2.3.2 Relevant Theories from Mediant Theory 
In general, there are two relevant conclusions from the mediant theory: the first 
(equivalence conditions) states two sufficient conditions for the equivalency between 
mediant and weighted mediant; and the second (deviation conditions) informs how the 
difference between them is correlated to the association between weights and values of the 
fractions.  
Equivalence Conditions: the mediant equals to the weighted mediant if any of the 
following conditions holds (see proofs in Appendix C):  
a. (Equal-weight Condition) all weights are equal: 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛 and 𝑤 ∈ ℝ>0; 
b. (Equal-fraction Condition) all fractions are equal: 
𝑎𝑖
𝑏𝑖
=
𝑎
𝑏
 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛 and 𝑎 ∈ ℝ≥0, 𝑏 ∈
ℝ>0. 
Deviation Condition: If a relatively larger fraction 
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛
 is associated with a relatively larger 
weight 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑚𝑤 > 𝑚. In another word, if the covariance between 
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛
 and 𝑤𝑛 is positive, 
then 𝑚𝑤 > 𝑚; otherwise, 𝑚𝑤 < 𝑚. A simple case when  𝑛 = 2 and a simulation with 𝑛 >
2 are shown in Appendix C.  
2.3.3 Extension to Vector and Matrix 
For the matrix setting, the mediant and weighted mediant could be defined as 
𝑀 = (𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + ⋯+ 𝐵𝑛)
−1(𝐴1 + 𝐴2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑛) = (∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,   
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𝑀𝑤 = (𝑤1𝐵1 + 𝑤2𝐵2 + ⋯+ 𝑤𝑛𝐵𝑛)
−1(𝑤1𝐴1 + 𝑤2𝐴2 + ⋯+ 𝑤𝑛𝐴𝑛) 
                        = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑖 , 
in which the “fraction” is 𝒇𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖
−1𝐴𝑖. Since FE and PD are vectors, we only consider the 
situations when 𝑀, 𝑀𝑤 and 𝒇𝑖 are vectors. Thus, if 𝐵𝑖 is, say a 𝐾 × 𝐾 invertible matrix, 
then 𝐴𝑖 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector and the resulting 𝑀, 𝑀𝑤 and 𝒇𝑖 are all 𝐾 × 1 vectors.  
It can be shown that both equivalence conditions hold, meaning that the mediant 
equals to the weighted median in the matrix setting when either all weights are equal or all 
matrix fractions are equal. For the equal-weight condition, if 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛, 
𝑀𝑤 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑤𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝐴𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀. This condition 
generalizes the case (in section 2.2) in which FE and PD are equivalent when cluster sizes 
are equal. For the equal-fraction condition, if 𝐵𝑖
−1𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵
−1𝐴 for all 𝑖, then 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝐵
−1𝐴, 
and 𝑀𝑤 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1(∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑖 )𝐵
−1𝐴 = 𝐵−1𝐴 =
(∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1(∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑖 𝐵
−1𝐴) = (∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑖 )
−1(∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑀. This condition suggests that if 𝒇𝑖 =
𝐵𝑖
−1𝐴𝑖 is the same for all 𝑖, the weighted mediant does not deviate from the mediant even 
though the weights are very different. In the case of ?̂?𝐹𝐸 and ?̂?𝑃𝐷, the fraction is  ?̂?𝑔 =
[?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔]
−1?̃?𝑔
′ ?̃?𝑔, which is the local OLS estimate of 𝜷 using observations only in cluster 𝑔. 
The equal-fraction condition informs us that if the local estimates are the same, ?̂?𝐹𝐸 equals 
to  ?̂?𝑃𝐷 no matter how different the cluster sizes are.  
Unfortunately, the deviation condition no longer holds. Measuring the vector 
deviations with either element-wise comparison or the Euclidean distance between vectors, 
no correlation can be found between weighting larger weights to “larger” matrix fractions 
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and “larger” changes from mediant vector to the weighted mediant vector20.  
In regression analysis, even under stationary assumption of 𝜷, local estimates ?̂?𝑔 
could still deviate from the true 𝜷 and vary across clusters due to differences in error 
structures and cluster sizes.  
For the variance-covariance matrices in (2.8) and (2.9), they are not in the form of 
matrix mediant and weighted mediant. Together with ?̂?𝐹𝐸 and ?̂?𝑃𝐷, the comparison 
between the variance estimators are examined by a Monte Carlo simulation in the next 
section. 
2.4 A MONTE CARLO APPROACH 
When weak statistical theory exists for an estimator, Monte Carlo methods are often 
applied to investigate the finite-sample properties of estimator and test statistics (Davidson 
& MacKinnon, 1993). This section introduces the Monte Carlo design for comparing the 
performance of FE and PD in linear fixed effects models.  
2.4.1 Performance Tests Used in this Paper 
The performance tests used in this paper include biasedness, efficiency and validity of 
inference. For the biasedness, it is measured by mean absolute errors in parameter 
estimates. Both FE and PD are expected to generate small mean squared errors, since they 
are both unbiased estimators. For the efficiency, it is measured by mean standard errors 
using either default i.i.d. standard error or cluster-robust standard errors (CRVE). The 
default i.i.d. standard error assumes the homoscedasticity and no serial correlation in error 
                                                 
20 The simulation results are not shown in the paper.  
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terms, and serves as a benchmark (Cameron et al., 2008). The cluster-robust standard errors 
(CRVE) are more popular since it allows both heteroscedastic and serial correlated error 
structures. Even in fixed effects model, the within-cluster correlation is not fully controlled 
and the CRVE should still be used (Cameron & Miller, 2015). See Kezdi (2003) for an 
excellent review on the relationship among different standard errors. For the validity of 
inference, it is measured by the rejection rate against a normal critical value at a certain 
confidence level.  
2.4.2 Monte Carlo Design 
The Monte Carlo design includes generating processes of the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and error terms, the number of clusters and total observations, the 
cluster sizes and unbalancedness, and the number of replication. Among these aspects, the 
unbalancedness is essential to distinct FE and PD. Ahren and Pincus (1981) provides a 
measure for the unbalancedness of an 𝑁𝑔-pattern, which has been used in the study of 
incomplete panels (e.g., Baltigi & Chang, 1994). The measure is defined as  
𝜏 = 𝐺/(?̅? ∑ 𝑁𝑔
−1
𝑔 ) ,                                                (2.10) 
where 𝐺 is the number of clusters, 𝑁𝑔 is the cluster size of 𝑔, ?̅? = 𝐺
−1 ∑ 𝑁𝑔𝑔 , and  𝜏 ranges 
in (0, 1]. Note that 𝜏 equals one when the pattern is balanced and gets smaller as the pattern 
becomes more unbalanced.  
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Table 2.1   Summary of Monte Carlo Simulation Designs* 
* The notations in the table are unified for comparison and may be different from the original literature. The number with * are calculated in 
this paper and are not reported in the original literature.  
** Only the heteroscedastic clustered errors case is shown here.  
CATEGORY ITEM 
Baltagi & Chang  
(1994) 
Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller 
(2008)**  
MacKinnon & Webb 
(2017) 
Model 
Specification 
𝑔 = 1,… , 𝐺;  𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁𝑔 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑔 
Parameter 𝛽0 = 5;   𝛽 = 0.5 𝛽0 = 1;   𝛽 = 1  𝛽 = 0 
Regressor 
𝒙𝒊𝒈 
Generation Process 
𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 0.3𝑖 + 0.8𝑥𝑖𝑔−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑔  
𝜔𝑖𝑔~𝕌[−0.5, 0.5] 
𝑥𝑔0 = 100 + 250𝜔𝑖𝑔  
𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 𝑧𝑔 + 𝑧𝑖𝑔 
𝑧𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 1) 
𝑧𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 1) 
𝑥𝑖𝑔~ℕ(0, 1) 
Independent across g 
Correlation of Regressors 𝝆𝒙 0.8* 0.5* {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} 
Error 
𝝁𝒊𝒈 
Generation Process 
𝜇𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔 
𝛼𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) 𝜀𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
𝜎𝛼
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2 = 20 
𝜇𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔 
𝛼𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 1) 
𝜀𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 9 × (𝑧𝑔 + 𝑧𝑖𝑔)
2) 
𝜇𝑖𝑔~ℕ(0, 1) 
Independent across g 
Correlation of Errors 𝝆𝝁 {0, 0.2, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.8, 0.9} Heteroscedastic {0, 0.1, …, 0.8, 0.9} 
Sample 
Number of Clusters 30/60/90/240 10 50/100 
Number of Total Obs. 210/420/630/1680 300 2000 
Unbalance 
Design 8 different patterns 
5 clusters with 10 obs and  
5 clusters with 50 obs 
proportional to US state sizes 
Measure 
{0.918, 0.841, 0.813, 0.754, 0.519, 
0.490, 0.209, 0.207} 
0.55556* 
0.3802* (50 clusters) 
0.3718* (100 clusters) 
Replication 
Per Experiment 1000 1000 400,000 
Bootstrap Sample N/A 399 399 
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The Monte Carlo study in this paper follows three studies in the literature involving 
unbalanced data design, summarized in Table 2.1. Baltigi and Chang (1994) focus on incomplete 
panels while Cameron et al. (2008) and MacKinnon and Webb (2017) on the clustered settings. 
Cameron et al. (2008) also introduce the case of heteroscedastic errors. These lead to different 
ways to generate regressors and error terms. The summary shows the parameter of interests: the 
within-cluster correlation of the regressor, the within-cluster correlation of the error, the number 
of clusters, the number of total observations, and the unbalancedness. The Monte Carlo design of 
this study is shown in Table 2.2. 
Following the three papers, the model used in this study is specified as: 
           𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑔,                𝑔 = 1,… , 𝐺,     𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑔, 
where 𝛽0 = 1, and 𝛽 = 1.  
For the homoscedastic case, the regressors 𝑥𝑖𝑔 is set to be one-dimensional and generated 
in two different ways: a panel setting following Baltigi and Chang (1994) and a clustered setting 
following Cameron et al. (2008). In the panel setting, 𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 0.3𝑖 + 𝜌𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑔−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑔, where 𝜔𝑖𝑔 is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [-0.5,0.5]. Note that a serial correlation 𝜌𝑥 is imposed to the 
units in one cluster based on a random order. 𝑥𝑔0 is set as 100 + 250𝜔𝑖𝑔 and excluded from the 
simulated data. In the clustered setting, 𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 𝑧𝑔 + 𝑧𝑖𝑔, in which 𝑧𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 ), 
𝑧𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 ), and 𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 + 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 = 20. In this case, the within-cluster correlation is 𝜌𝑥 =
𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 /(𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 + 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 ). For both settings, 𝜌𝑥 takes a value from {0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9} in each experiment. 
For the error terms, it is assumed that 𝜇𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔, and 𝛼𝑔~IIN(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) and 𝜀𝑖𝑔~IIN(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). 
Let 𝜎𝛼
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2 = 20, and the within-cluster correlation of errors is 𝜌𝜇 = 𝜎𝛼
2/(𝜎𝛼
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2). 𝜌𝜇 will take 
values in {0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9}, same with 𝜌𝑥. 
For the heteroscedastic case, following Cameron et al. (2008) in Table 2.1 except that the 
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within-cluster correlation of regressors is allowed to take different values. In contrast to the 
homoscedastic case, the sum of variances of regressor components is changed to 2. The 
idiosyncratic term is generated as 𝜀𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 9 × 𝑥𝑖𝑔
2 ), through which the heteroscedasticity is 
introduced. As a result, the within-cluster correlation of errors is undetermined. All other settings 
are the same for all cases.   
Table 2.2   Monte Carlo Simulation Design 
CATEGORY ITEM DESIGN 
Model 
Specification 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑔 
𝑔 = 1,… , 𝐺;  𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁𝑔 
Parameter 𝛽0 = 1;   𝛽 = 1 
Regressor 
𝒙𝒊𝒈 
Generation Process 
Homoscedasticity Heteroscedasticity 
Panel Setting 
𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 0.3𝑖 + 𝜌𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑔−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑔 
𝜔𝑖𝑔~𝕌[−0.5, 0.5] 
𝑥𝑔0 = 100 + 250𝜔𝑖𝑔 
 
Clustered Setting 
𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 𝑧𝑔 + 𝑧𝑖𝑔 
𝑧𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 ) 
𝑧𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 ) 
𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 + 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 = 20 
Clustered Setting 
𝑥𝑖𝑔 = 𝑧𝑔 + 𝑧𝑖𝑔 
𝑧𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 ) 
𝑧𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 ) 
𝜎𝑧𝑔
2 + 𝜎𝑧𝑖
2 = 2 
Correlation of 
Regressors 𝝆𝒙 
𝝆𝒙 ∈{0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9} 
Error 
𝝁𝒊𝒈 
Generation Process 
𝜇𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔 
𝛼𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) 𝜀𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
𝜎𝛼
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2 = 20 
𝜇𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔 
𝛼𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 1) 
𝜀𝑖𝑔~𝕀𝕀ℕ(0, 9 × 𝑥𝑖𝑔
2 ) 
Correlation of Errors 
𝝆𝝁 
𝝆𝝁 ∈{0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9} N/A 
Sample 
Number of 
Clusters 𝐺 
𝐺 ∈ {2, 4, 6, …, 36, 38, 40} 
Number of Total 
Obs. 
{40, 80, 120, …, 320, 360, 400} 
Unbalance 
Design 
3 base patterns 
𝑃1 = 2(1), 38(1); 
𝑃2 = 6(1), 34(1); 
𝑃3 = 14(1), 26(1) 
Measure  𝜏 𝜏 ∈ {0.19, 0.51, 0.91} 
Replication Per Experiment  𝑅 10000 
For the sample design, it is worth noting that the number of clusters and clusters sizes will 
determine the unbalancedness. An ideal design could fix the unbalanceness while the number of 
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clusters varies. This cannot be achieved by randomly choosing cluster sizes at each given number 
of clusters. All three papers apply fixed design of cluster sizes to control for the unbalancedness. 
This paper follows this method and choose three different unbalanced levels {0.19, 0.51, 0.91}. 
The details of cluster-size design are discussion as follows. 
First, I introduce the concept of a base design. A key property of the unbalancedness 
measure 𝜏 in (10) is that replicating a sample pattern, the unbalancedness is unchanged. Take an 
example from Baltigi and Chang (1994). Let 5(15) represent a sample pattern with 15 clusters, 
each with 5 observations. A 30-cluster sample pattern 𝑃 = 5(15), 9(15) has an unbalanced level 
of 0.918. If one replicates 𝑃 once and gets 𝑃′ = 5(30), 9(30), the unbalanced level of this 60-
cluster sample 𝑃′ is still 0.918. One could reduce the number of clusters to 2 and get sample 𝑃𝑏 =
5(1), 9(1) with the same unbalanced level. I called this smallest sample as a base design for this 
pattern (half sample with size 5, the other half with size 9). Any integer replications of the base 
design have the same unbalanced level, which allows us to control for the unbalancedness as the 
number of clusters grows. 
In this paper, I do not directly apply Baltigi and Chang (1994)’s designs for three reasons. 
First, many of their designs contain clusters with only one observation, which contribute nothing 
to within-cluster variations. Second, given a base design with 2 clusters, I could examine all even 
numbers of clusters. However, many designs in Baltigi and Chang (1994) are based on 5 or more 
clusters, for example 𝑃4 = 3(9), 5(6), 9(6), 11(9) has a base design 3(3), 5(2), 9(2), 11(3) with 
10 clusters; and 𝑃8 = 1(20), 10(5), 28(5) has a base design 1(4), 10(1), 28(1) with 6 clusters. 
In these cases, we could only examine the numbers of clusters {10, 20, 30, …} or {6, 12, 18, …}, 
with many cases being skipped in simulations. Third, the 2-cluster base designs in their study 
contain only 14 number of observations, which is too small for valid inferences with few clusters.  
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As a result, this study takes three different base designs: 𝑃1 = 2(1), 38(1); 𝑃2 =
6(1), 34(1); and 𝑃3 = 14(1), 26(1). The unbalanced levels are {0.19, 0.51, 0.91}, representing 
the cases of severely unbalanced, middle-level unbalanced, and almost balanced. Given the 
number of clusters, the total number of observations is the same across different unbalanced 
designs (see details in Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3   Sample and Unbalancedness Design 
Design 
𝐆 = 𝟐 
(Base) 
𝐆 = 𝟒 𝐆 = 𝟔 … 𝐆 = 𝟑𝟖 𝐆 = 𝟒𝟎 
Unbalance 
𝝉 
𝑷𝟏 
2(1), 
38(1) 
2(2), 
38(2) 
2(3), 
38(3) 
… 
2(19), 
38(19) 
2(20), 
38(20) 
0.19 
𝑷𝟐 
6(1), 
34(1) 
6(2), 
34(2) 
6(3), 
34(3) 
… 
6(19), 
34(19) 
6(20), 
34(20) 
0.51 
𝑷𝟑 
14(1), 
26(1) 
14(2), 
26(2) 
14(3), 
26(3) 
… 
14(19), 
26(19) 
14(20), 
26(20) 
0.91 
Number of 
Observations 
40 80 120 … 360 800  
 
For each simulation, the process is proceeded as in MacKinnon and Webb (2017): 
1. Specify the generation process of the regressor to be panel setting or clustered setting; 
and if clustered setting, whether homoscedastic or heteroscedastic.  
2. Specify 𝜏 ∈ {0.19, 0.51, 0.91} and corresponding sample base design; 
3. Specify  𝜌𝑥 ∈ {0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9} and 𝜌𝜇 ∈ {0, 1/3, 0.5, 2/3, 0.9}; 
4. Specify the number of clusters 𝐺 ∈ {2, 4, 6, … , 36, 38, 40}; 
5. Based on the configuration above, a sample data (𝑥𝑖𝑔, 𝜇𝑖𝑔, and 𝑦𝑖𝑔) is generated through 
the data generation process. Both FE and PD are applied to produce ?̂?𝐹𝐸 and ?̂?𝑃𝐷 as 
estimates for 𝛽 = 1, and to calculate default i.i.d. standard errors and CRVE.  
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6. The absolute errors |?̂? − 𝛽| are calculated each time for both FE and PD estimates. 
Hypothesis testing is conducted using t test with i.i.d. standard error or CRVE against 
the normal critical value 1.96 at 95% confidence level. 
7. Repeat the two preceding steps 10,000 times, and calculate the mean absolute error 
over replications, and the mean of the 10,000 standard error estimates (both i.i.d. and 
CRVE), and estimate the rejection frequency of 10,000 replications. 
2.4.3 Simulation Results 
Unbiasedness 
For the unbiasedness of FE and PD, the mean absolute error (MEA) and relative mean absolute 
error (RMAE) in parameter estimation are shown in the Table 2.4 to Table 2.8. Generally, since 
FE and PD are unbiased and consistent estimators, their MAEs are small in most cases as 
expected—less than 0.01 given that the true value 𝛽0 equals to 1.   
For the homoscedastic case, in the panel setting (Table 2.4), the largest errors (0.01893 for 
FE and 0.01961 for PD) occur when the data is almost balanced and the within-cluster correlations 
of both regressors and errors are zero.  In the clustered setting (Table 2.5), the largest errors 
(0.03925 for FE and 0.02807 for PD) appear in the same situation except that the correlation of 
the error are very high. The relative mean absolute errors are calculated by the MSA ratios of PD 
to FE and summarized in Table 2.6. Most values are around 1, indicating similar results of FE and 
PD. For the heteroscedastic case, the results are similar. There seem to be no specific settings in 
which FE or PD outperforms the other. Considering the small values of MAEs, the differences are 
trivial.  
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Efficiency  
To compare the estimation efficiency of FE and PD, the change rates from FE to PD are calculated 
for both default i.i.d. standard errors and CRVE as  
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(%) =
𝑠𝑒𝑃𝐷 − 𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐸
𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐸
× 100. 
Note that a negative change rate indicates an efficiency improvement of PD over FE; while a 
positive one means an efficiency loss. The results of the homo- and hetero-scedastic cases are 
reported in Table 2.9-2.10 and Table 2.11, respectively. 
Homoscedastic Case 
 For i.i.d. standard errors, FE and PD are very similar in the clustered setting. In contrast, 
in the panel setting, the differences between FE and PD vary with 𝝆𝝁 and the unbalanced level 𝜏. 
First, when there is no correlation among within-cluster errors (𝝆𝝁 = 0), PD always shows an 
efficiency improvement over FE by more than 5% when the unbalanced level is middle or low 
(𝜏 = 0.51 or 0.91), or around 1.2% when the data is severely unbalanced (𝜏 = 0.19). Second, 
when the correlation among within-cluster errors is 0.5, PD exhibits an efficiency loss from FE by 
around 15% when the unbalanced level is middle, or around 3%-5% when the data is either 
severely unbalanced or almost balanced. Third, when within-cluster errors are highly correlated 
(𝝆𝝁 = 0.9), the situation may differ: PD improves FE by 1%-2% when the data is severely or 
middle-level unbalanced; PD worsens FE by less than 1% given an almost balanced data. While 
the within-cluster correlations of the regressors 𝝆𝒙 make no differences for any comparison, the 
number of clusters 𝐺 does influence the magnitude of the differences to some extent. With 𝐺 
increases, all differences tend to shrink by a small amount (0%-3%).  
For CRVE, the story changes. It is the number of clusters 𝐺 that determines the comparison. 
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In the clustered setting, for small 𝐺 (less than 10), PD has smaller CRVE than FE. Given 𝐺 = 2, 
this improvement reaches the largest 94% when the data is severely unbalanced, around 76% when 
middle-level unbalanced, and 22% when almost balanced. This advantage shrinks very fast as 𝐺 
increases. At 𝐺 = 6, only around 1.6%, 4.5% and 3% improvements are kept at three unbalanced 
levels. When 𝐺 is larger than 10, the loss starts and gets larger. As 𝐺 grows, the increase in loss 
slows down and CRVEs for FE and PD converge to their own limits. In this process, neither 𝝆𝝁 
nor 𝝆𝒙 is significantly relevant. In the panel setting, the situation is very similar except that 𝝆𝝁 
matters. When 𝝆𝝁 = 0.5, the advantage of PD over FE disappears faster given middle-level 
unbalanced or almost balanced data, starting an efficiency loss by 1%-2% at 𝐺 = 6. Generally, in 
these two cases (𝝆𝝁 = 0.5 with 𝜏 = 0.51 and  𝝆𝝁 = 0.5 with 𝜏 = 0.91), PD is less advantageous 
in the panel setting than in the clustered one in three aspects: smaller efficiency gain for small 𝐺, 
larger decrease rate in efficiency gain as 𝐺 increases, and larger efficiency loss for large 𝐺. When 
the data is severely unbalanced, 𝝆𝝁 = 0.5 also makes the efficiency loss larger than the level in 
the clustered setting.   
 Figure 2.1 to 2.2 show how the change rates vary with the increases in the number of 
clusters in different data settings given 𝝆𝒙 = 0.5. For CRVE in all cases, PD does exhibit a faster 
convergence rate than FE, however, with the number of clusters increases, FE converges to a lower 
level than PD.  
Heteroscedastic Case 
 Under heteroscedastic assumption, the comparison using CRVE seems to be the same with 
the homoscedastic case, except that a higher within-cluster correlation of regressors favors PD 
over FE. For the default i.i.d. standard errors, PD and FE lead to similar results except that when 
the within-cluster correlation of regressors is high and the number of clusters is less than 10, PD 
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generates smaller values by 1%-6%. 
Rejection Rate 
The rejection rate matters since it validates the usage of standard errors to make inference. The 
results of the rejection rates for both i.i.d. standard errors and CRVE in the panel and the clustered 
settings are shown in Table 2.11-2.14; and for the heteroscedastic case in Table 2.15-2.16.  
With homoscedastic errors, for both FE and PD, the i.i.d. standard errors have rejection 
rates very close to the nominal level 0.05 (Table 2.11-2.12). This is because after mean-
differencing, the within-cluster correlations in both regressors and errors are eliminated. The 
transformed data is basically i.i.d., in which the default standard errors are valid. However, under 
heteroscedasticity, the i.i.d. standard errors always over-reject. In contrary, the CRVE shows over-
rejection issue in both homo- and hetero-scedastic cases, and the over-rejection becomes less 
severe as the number of clusters 𝐺 grows, similar to the findings of Cameron et al. (2008). In the 
heteroscedastic case, the faster convergence rate is found to be associated with a very high within-
cluster correlation of regressors.   
2.4.4 Result Summary 
In summary, PD shows efficiency improvement over FE in some cases. This section inspects the 
validity of these cases with the rejection rates.  
The most significant efficiency improvements of PD over FE occur when using CRVE 
given the number of clusters less than 10 (Table 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11). However, results in Table 
2.14-2.16 show the severe over-rejection issue of CRVE when 𝐺 is small. One exception is under 
heteroscedasticity, when 𝐺 ranges from 6 to 10 and 𝝆𝒙 = 0.9, the rejection rates of CRVE are from 
0.059 to 0.071, which are close to the nominal level.  
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Other improvements happen to the default i.i.d. standard errors in homoscedastic panel 
settings and in heteroscedastic clustered settings with few clusters. In the former setting, the 
improvements are about 1.2% when data is severely unbalanced and 𝝆𝝁 = 0 or 𝝆𝝁 = 0.9, about 
2% when data is middle-level unbalanced and 𝝆𝝁 = 0.9, and about 5.2% when the data is either 
middle-level unbalanced or almost balanced and 𝝆𝝁 = 0. The rejection rates are very close to the 
nominal size 0.05 in all these cases. In the latter setting, the improvement is 1%-6% when the 
number of clusters is less than 10. However, over-rejection occurs to i.i.d. standard errors in this 
setting.  
Overall, there are two cases in which PD has valid efficiency advantage over FE: (1) for 
i.i.d. standard errors: panel setting + homoscedasticity +  𝝆𝝁 = 0 or 0.9; (2) for CRVE: clustered 
setting + heteroscedasticity + 𝝆𝒙 = 0.9 + 𝐺 ∈ [6, 10]. In the former case, although the rejection 
rates are very close to the nominal level 0.05, the assumptions especially the homoscedasticity 
seem to be restrictive. In contrast, the latter one allows heteroscedasticity. The main restrictions 
are on 𝝆𝒙 = 0.9, which means the regressors are very similar within clusters, and on the number 
of clusters ranging from 6 to 10.   
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the properties of the pairwise differences estimator (PD) in comparison with 
the fixed effects estimator (FE) in linear fixed effects models. The main finding is that PD is a 
generalized version of FE by weighting each observation by its cluster size. There are two 
conditions for them to be equivalent: 1) the cluster sizes are equal (balanced data); 2) the local 
estimates using each cluster data are equal. The question addressed in this paper is: when FE and 
PD are distinct, i.e. given unbalanced data and unequal local estimates, is PD a good alternative to 
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FE in linear fixed effects models? 
Since both FE and PD are unbiased and consistent estimator under regular assumptions and 
the efficiency comparison is undetermined theoretically, this paper designs a Monte Carlo 
simulation with different data settings. The results show that: 1) both FE and PD provide accurate 
estimation in the parameter of interest; 2) valid efficiency improvements of PD over FE occur 
when: using the default i.i.d. standard errors in the homoscedastic panel data with the within-
cluster error correlations being zero or very high; or using the cluster-robust standard errors in 
heteroscedastic clustered data with very high within-cluster regressor correlations and the number 
of clusters ranging from 6 to 10. Considering in the empirical works nowadays, CRVE is very 
popular and big data sets are more available, in most cases, the fixed effects estimator (FE) would 
still be the more efficient choice than the pairwise differences estimators (PD). 
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Table 2.4   Mean Absolute Errors (Panel Setting) 
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Table 2.5   Mean Absolute Errors (Clustered Setting) 
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Table 2.6   Relative Mean Absolute Errors (PD/ FE) 
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Table 2.7   Mean Absolute Errors (Heteroscedasticity) 
 
 
Table 2.8   Relative Mean Absolute Errors (Heteroscedasticity; PD/ FE) 
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Table 2.9   Change Rate % in Standard Error (Panel Setting) 
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Table 2.10  Change Rate % in Standard Error (Clustered Setting) 
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Figure 2.1   Change Rate in Mean Standard Error (Panel Setting, 𝝆𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
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Figure 2.2   Change Rate in Mean Standard Error (Clustered Setting, 𝝆𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
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Table 2.11  Change Rate % in Standard Error (Heteroscedasticity) 
 
 
Figure 2.3   Change Rate in Mean Standard Error (Heteroscedasticity, 𝝆𝒙 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
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Table 2.12  Rejection Rate (Default I.I.D., Nominal Size 0.05, Panel Setting) 
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Table 2.13  Rejection Rate (Default I.I.D., Nominal Size 0.05, Clustered Setting) 
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Table 2.14  Rejection Rate of CRVE (Nominal Size 0.05, Panel Setting) 
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Table 2.15  Rejection Rate of CRVE (Nominal Size 0.05, Clustered Setting) 
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Table 2.16  Rejection Rate when Heteroscedasticity 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODELING BUY-SELLER IN HOUSING MARKET—A BIDDING NETWORK 
PERSPECTIVE TO UNDERSTAND MARKET MECHANISM 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 Define Buy-sellers 
This paper studies “buy-sellers” in housing markets. A buy-seller refers to a household or 
individual who is making both buying and selling decisions which are interdependent in certain 
ways. A typical example is an intra-urban residential mover. Imagine in a city an owner-occupier 
wants to buy a new house. Due to some reasons, he may have to sell the current unit to achieve the 
purchase. There are two possible reasons for this: 1) budget constraints: a household has to cash 
the owning unit to afford the new purchase; 2) policy constraints: a household may not be allowed 
to own more than a certain number of units due to housing policies such as purchase restrictions. 
In either case, a purchase decision is contingent on a successful sale. This paper calls this 
dependency a “must-sell” restriction and the household with such restriction a “buy-seller”. 
Also, for a buy-seller, the final decision on sale may reversely depend on a successful 
purchase, or at least an accepted bid. This commonly happens to single-house owner-occupiers. 
They may be reluctant to sign a sale contract without a guaranteed purchase; otherwise, they may 
end up in a rental unit. This paper calls this dependency a “must-buy” restriction. Note that this 
restriction may not exist for multi-house owners or those single-house owners who do not care to 
rent. In all, a buy-seller in this paper must be constrained by the “must-sell” restriction and may 
additionally be subject to the “must-buy” restriction. The two restrictions and the resultant buy-
sell interdependency distinguish the buy-sellers from all household participants that have been 
modeled in the literature.  
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3.1.2 Resale Behavior and Dichotomic Tradition 
Models of resale housing markets have discussed both buying and selling behaviors of households 
extensively. However, most modeling efforts have constrained a household in a dichotomic 
manner, as either a buyer or a seller. In a few studies, being a buyer and seller at the same time has 
been acknowledged and such “joint buyer-seller problem” (Anenberg & Bayer, 2013) has been 
modeled to study the volatility of transaction volume and prices in urban housing markets (Moen, 
Nenov, & Sniekers, 2015; Stein, 1995). In addition, the literature on intra-urban mobility, housing 
adjustment, and moving and transaction costs have shed light on the relationship between the 
owning and the desired units (e.g., Rosen, 1986; Winstanley et al., 2002; Brasington, 2014). 
However, neither “must-buy” and “must-sell” restrictions nor the interdependency feature of buy-
sellers has been explored. One possible reason is that the dichotomic framework would regard a 
buy-seller as two independent roles in two different transactions: a buyer in one and a seller in 
another, treating the interdependency as nonexistent or trivial. In fact, the interdependency feature 
of buy-sellers not only exists but also provides rich insights into housing market mechanisms. In 
recent literature of economic matching theory, Fleiner et al. (2017) explicitly argue, “houses are 
highly differentiated, and agents might act as both buyers and sellers, making the housing market 
an interconnected trading network.” This paper shows this point by illustrating how buy-sellers 
build connections in bidding networks in an agent-based model (ABM). 
3.1.3 Bidding Network Insights 
In essence, the “must-buy” and “must-sell” restrictions not only change the decision process of 
households, but also make buy-sellers influential “nodes” in trading networks. From the 
perspective of the graph theory, at any given time, buyers and sellers are vertices (nodes), and the 
bids made by buyers for sellers are edges (links). Without buy-sellers, all vertices are touched only 
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by edges from one side (bidding or bidden); and the whole market comprises disconnected and 
independent edges between each buyer-seller pair. If the bid is accepted, the edge becomes a 
transaction; otherwise, the edge is eliminated, and the connected buyer has to make a new bid in 
the next step. For buy-sellers, since they bid for others’ housing units at the same time receive bids 
from others, they are touched by edges from both sides and thus connect the market as a network.  
Beyond the connectedness, what is more interesting is the dependency in the network. The 
“must-buy” and “must-sell” restrictions make two edges connecting a buy-seller depend on each 
other. Any success or failure of any bids (links) will influence the results of other bids via the buy-
seller nodes throughout the network. For example, a sale contract of a buy-seller is breached by 
his buyer for some reasons. Being constrained by “must-sell” restriction, this buy-seller has to 
withdraw his successful bid for a new house, which is a breach of another sale contract directly 
affecting the owner of that house. If that owner is also a buy-seller, this “torch of the breach” will 
be passed on to the end of the chain, which is typically a pure-seller.   
3.1.4 Existence of Buy-sellers 
Buy-sellers exist in housing markets which have factors reinforcing both restrictions. In markets 
where houses are less affordable; and where housing purchase restrictions are harsh, the “must-
sell” restriction is strong. In markets where single-house owners prevail, and the notion of home 
ownership is strong, the “must-buy” restriction would be strong. For example, in Beijing, the past 
decade witnessed a housing market boom. The government of Beijing has issued a series of 
policies to cool down the market, including the housing purchase restrictions (HPR). Also, Chinese 
people have a particularly strong notion of ownership, which makes rental an inferior choice. The 
author conducted a housing consumer survey in Beijing in summer 2016, involving 1129 housing 
buyers. One finding is that almost half (45%) of the housing buyers are “exchanging” housing, 
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that means they sold or are selling their houses before the current purchase. Although an exchange 
buyer is not necessarily a buyer-seller (BS) since the “must-sell” and “must-buy” restrictions may 
not exist, this high ratio shows the potential of buy-sellers representing almost half of the market 
demand.  
3.1.5 Agent-based Models  
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is commonly employed to simulate the dynamics of urban and 
housing markets, aiming at reproducing the emergence of an observed pattern of social 
phenomena. It has advantages in modeling land and property market from a button-up perspective 
and demonstrates flexibility and implicative power for public policies. Traditional ABMs in 
housing and land market mainly employ urban economic theories as theoretical foundations to 
model the behaviors of household agents (Filatova, 2015), and have developed the behavioral 
designs of both buyers and sellers for decades (Parker and Filatova, 2008).  
Among all urban-residential ABMs, 59% of them involves household relocation process. 
See Huang et al. (2014) for an excellent review. However, the conventional practice is to assume 
sellers are either 1) landlords who charge rents or 2) households who are leaving the market. The 
first assumption follows the traditions of classic location models (Alonso, 1960) and ABMs 
(Schelling, 1971). The market supply is only from landlords, and the agents are merely renters 
rather than owner-occupiers and move without transactions. The second assumption involves 
housing transactions but assumes that the sellers quit the market without re-purchase behaviors, 
suggesting that they are either leaving the region or staying in other properties of their own. Both 
assumptions are restrictive for the development of empirical ABMs of the regions with dominant 
resale housing markets.  
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3.2 A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK 
Imagine a market with eight households, households 1-3 are pure-buyers (PB), households 4-7 are 
buy-sellers (BS), and household 8 is a pure-seller (PS). In this market, each buyer (PB + BS) makes 
a bid for a house owning by a seller (BS+PS). After bidding, a directed graph is formed with nodes 
representing households (PB, BS, and PS) and directed edges representing bids from buyers to 
sellers. (Figure 3.1)   
 
Figure 3.1   A Bidding Network Example 
Traditionally, a bid is either accepted or declined. The accepted bid becomes a trade; the 
declined buyer will search and bid in the next round. With the presence of buy-sellers, this situation 
is more complicated. For example, BS household 4 receives two bids from 1 and 5, respectively. 
For any reason, household 4 accepts household 1’s bid and declines household 5’s. If household 5 
is a BS with both “must-buy” and “must-sell” restrictions, the failure in bidding forces him to 
decline household 2 and 6. Similarly, household 6, as a BS, has to decline household 4’s bid. 
Consequently, household 4 fails and has to decline 1’s bid. At last, the entire subgraph 1 fails. In 
contrast, subgraph 2 could be successful. After being accepted by household 8, the household 7 
could accept 3’s bid; and both bids become successful trades.  
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In fact, with the presence of the buy-sellers who are restricted by the “must-buy” and 
“must-sell” conditions, there are only two successful patterns: a loop pattern connecting BS and a 
chain pattern connecting PB, BS, and PS. In reality, every final trade between a home buyer and a 
home seller should be a component of patterns in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2   Successful Patterns with Buy-sellers 
One may argue that once being declined, the BS does not need to decline all their bids. The 
BS could choose to accept the highest bid and ask the buyer to wait until the BS finds a new house. 
If this is the case, the subgraph 1 will not fall apart immediately. Household 5 could still accept, 
say 2, and ask household 2 for a contract which holds the bid for a term. Now, instead of failing, 
both household 5 and 2 are pending on the market. Since household 2 is a PB, if household 5 could 
succeed in bidding a house of a PS, they three could form a chain pattern and successfully finish 
the transactions. However, if household 5 bids a house of another BS, the destiny of both 5 and 2 
depend on that of the new BS. This is how BS connects and affects others on the bidding network.  
3.3 AGENT-BASED MODEL DESIGN 
3.3.1 Agents 
There four types of agents in this ABM: buyers, sellers, bids, and patterns. Their generation, 
interaction, and elimination form the flow of the model.  
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Buyer, Seller, and Buy-seller 
The buyers and sellers refer to households. This ABM models a buy-seller (BS) as two identities—
buyer and seller. At each round, the ABM generates two groups of agents: buyers and sellers. A 
buy-seller (BS) is a pair of buyer and seller. Thus, the buyer group comprises the pure-buyers (PB) 
and the buyer side of BS (denoted as BSb); the seller group comprises the pure-sellers (PS) and the 
seller side of BS (denoted as BSs). In this ABM, this is realized by allocating ID to the agents in 
the following way.  
• In a certain round, among the existing buyers and sellers, the largest ID number is 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 
(if in the first round, 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥=0). For the new added 𝑁𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤 new buyers and 𝑁𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 new sellers, 
index their IDs as 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1,… , 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑁𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1,… , 𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑁𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤. 
• Since the number of the new buyer-sellers 𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤  cannot be larger than either 𝑁𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤  or 
𝑁𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤. Thus, specify a share parameter 𝛼𝐵𝑆 such that 𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝛼𝑏𝑠 × min (𝑁𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝑁𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤). 
And the first 𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 of the new IDs of the buyers and sellers are denoted as buyer-sellers.  
Then, the number of new pure-buyers (PB) is  𝑁𝑃𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤 is 𝑁𝑃𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑁𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤. The number 
of new pure-sellers (PS) is 𝑁𝑃𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 is 𝑁𝑃𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑁𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤. The share of the BS in the new 
population is 
𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑁𝑃𝐵
𝑛𝑒𝑤+𝑁𝑃𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤+𝑁𝐵𝑆
𝑛𝑒𝑤. 
An example is shown in Figure 3.3. Note that the BSb and BSs have the same ID number.  
 
Figure 3.3   ABM ID Allocation 
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Behaviors and Status 
Buyers and sellers have three statuses: active, success, and pending. The new added buyers and 
sellers are active.  
An active buyer will sort (randomly) all available houses (sellers) on the market and make 
a bid for the favorite. If the bid is not accepted, this buyer stays active and does the same things in 
the next round. If the bid is accepted, this buyer could be in a certain bidding pattern. If the pattern 
is a successful one, the buyer’s status changes to success and quit the market. If the pattern is a 
pending one, the buyer’s status changes to pending and sign a contract with a maximum waiting 
time T rounds. In each of the following T rounds, the pending buyer will check whether the 
pending pattern changes to a successful one. If it does, the buyer’s status changes to success; 
otherwise, the buyer becomes active and restarts from the very beginning.  
An active seller waits for bids from buyers. Without receiving any bids in a certain round, 
the seller stays active and keeps waiting until the next round. Once receiving at least one bid, the 
seller will choose the highest bid to accept and lie in a pattern. Similar to the buyer, depending on 
the pattern being successful or pending, the seller’s status changes to success or pending; the 
pending seller will wait and change into success or back to active.  
The status of a BS depends on the status of both buyer and seller sides. Each side would 
behave in the corresponding way. If both sides are in the same status, the BS would be in that 
status. Due to the must-buy and must-sell restrictions, no single side could be successful alone. So, 
the complexity emerges when two sides have different status, one active and one pending (Table 
3.1). In these situations, only one side—either BSb or BSs—of the BS would be active and act as 
a PB or PS in bidding patterns. The details of the behavior flow are shown in Figure 3.4.  
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Table 3.1   Buy-seller Status 
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Figure 3.4    Flow Chart of Agents
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3.3.2 Bids 
A bid is a link connecting a buyer and a seller. A bid is formed when a buyer makes a bid 
to a seller. A status of a bid could be accepted, declined, successful, and pending. After 
being accepted, a bid could be in a certain pattern. If the pattern is pending, the bid’s status 
changes to pending with a maximum waiting time T; if the pattern is successful, the bid is 
successful. For a pending bid, it stays in a pending status until either the pending pattern 
changes into a successful one or the waiting time is up. In the former case, the bid becomes 
successful; while in the latter, the bid becomes a declined one. This flow is illustrated in 
the Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5   Flow Chart of Bids 
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3.3.3 Patterns 
Five Basic Types 
A pattern is a list of accepted bids. It is formed after sellers make the decision of accepting 
or declining bids. There are five basic types of patterns (Table 3.2).  
The first and the fifth are successful patterns. The first pattern is the successful 
chain pattern, starting from a PB and ending by a PS with any number of BS in between; 
the fifth pattern is the only loop pattern, connecting at least two BS in a closed loop. All 
buyers, sellers, and bids in these two patterns are successful.  
The rest three patterns are all pending chains. They are pending because at least one 
of two endings of the chain are BS. In the second pattern, the right ending BS fails as a 
buyer but succeeds as a seller. Thus, only the seller side BSs enters this pattern and becomes 
pending; while the buyer side of this BS—BSb—is still active and act as a PB in the next 
round. Similarly, in the third pattern, the left ending BS has a pending BSb but active BSs. 
The fourth pattern has the similar situation at both ends. In all three patterns, the BS in 
between the two ends are pending BS.  
Table 3.2   Five Basic Types of Patterns 
Pattern Form Status 
 
Chain Success 
 
Chain Pending 
 
Chain Pending 
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Chain Pending 
 
Loop Success 
 
Growth and Decay 
A pattern grows by combining with other patterns and decays when any of the bids in the 
pattern expires.  
In each round, the market generates new pending patterns. These patterns could be 
combined with existing patterns. There are five basic combinations between two pending 
patterns (Table 3.3). The combinations could be successful patterns or new pending 
patterns. For example, in the first round, a BS household signed a contract with a PB but 
failed in bidding for the target house. Thus, this BS is pending on the seller side (i.e., BSs 
in the Pattern 2) but active on the buyer side BSb. In the second round, this BS successfully 
bid a house of a PS, thus his buyer side BSb falls in the pattern 3. Since both buyer and 
seller sides are successful, this BS, together with the PB and PS, becomes successful. In 
the graph, this means that Pattern 2 and Pattern 3 are combined into a Pattern 1, the 
successful chain pattern (the first row in the Table3.3). If in the second the BS bid for a 
house of another BS but that BS fails in bidding, as a result, the former BS becomes 
pending BS (on both side) and has to wait for the latter one to find in the next round. This 
is the combination between a Pattern 2 and a Pattern 4 (the second row in the Table 3.3), 
and the result is still a pending Pattern 2. Note that the combination could happen among 
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more than two patterns. The result could be thought as multiple steps of combinations of 
two patterns.   
Table 3.3   Basic Combination of Two Pending Patterns 
Index First Pattern Second Pattern Combined Pattern Status 
1 
   
Success 
2 
   
Pending 
3 
   
Pending 
4 
   
Pending 
5 
  
 
Success 
 
At the end of each round, each pending bid checks whether the contract expires. If 
the contract does, the bid becomes declined, the statuses of the connecting buyer and seller 
switch from pending to active, and the pattern is broken at this link into pieces. The pieces 
are new patterns. If all bids in a pattern expire at the same time, the pattern disappears.  
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3.3.4 Model Flow  
There is a clock in the world and counting as rounds 𝑡. It is the time unit for agents to bid, 
to wait, and to decide. One unit of 𝑡 could be thought as a month. The model proceeds in 
the following steps shown in the Figure 3.6.  
1. Adding New Agents. At the beginning of each round, new buyers and sellers 
are added to the existing active ones.  
2. Buyer rank preference. Each active seller is assumed to sell only one house 
on the market. Each active buyer is assumed to know all houses listed on the market (maybe 
through an online system) and form a preference list over them. 
3. Buyer make a bid. Each active buyer bids for the first available house in his 
preference list. Each active buyer is allowed to make only one bid each round.  
4. Seller accept & decline bids. If there is no bid for a seller, that seller finishes 
this round and stay active for the next round; otherwise, the seller screens all received bids, 
accepts one and declines the others. Every bid has the same probability to be chosen, except 
that the probability for the bids from buyer-sellers may be 𝛾𝑏𝑠 ≥ 1 times those from pure-
buyers. This advantage represents the buy-sellers’ higher bidding power than pure buyers 
who have no assets. 𝛾𝑏𝑠 = 1 means equal power between PB and BS. All declined buyers 
stay active for the next round and all declined bids are eliminated.  
Each accepted bid is identified in one of the five basic patterns. Successful chain 
(Pattern 1) and loop patterns (Pattern 5) and the involving buyers, sellers, and bids are 
moved to the successful stock.  
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5. New pending sign contract T and Existing pending wait time t + 1. In each 
new pending pattern, the buyer and the seller for each component bid sign a contract for a 
maximum waiting time T. For the existing pending patterns, the waiting time of each 
component bid and involving buyer and seller accumulates one.  
6. Combine pending patterns. Each new pattern is check for combination. If 
its combination with any of the existing pending patterns is a successful pattern, both new 
and existing component patterns are moved from pending to successful. If the combined 
pattern is still pending or there is no combination, the new pending pattern moves into the 
pending pattern stock.  
7. Bid declined and pattern decays. For each bid in the pending patterns, if its 
contract expires, the bid is declined, its connecting buyer and seller become active again, 
and its superior pattern decays.  
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Figure 3.6   Flow Chart of ABM 
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3.3.5 Algorithm to Identify Patterns 
This paper develops an algorithm to identify all patterns—both successful and pending. 
Traditional ABM algorithms can only be applied to identify Pattern 1 between PB and PS. 
For chain patterns (Pattern 1 to 4), the key is to find buyers or sellers at either end of the 
chain, which are touched by one accepted bid on one side. Starting from the agent at the 
end, one could find all connected buyers and sellers in the same chain pattern along bids. 
However, in the loop pattern (Pattern 5), there are no ends. The best way to identify Pattern 
5 is that after identifying all four chain patterns, the left unidentified bids must be in loop 
patterns. The algorithm contains following steps. 
1. Starting from each PS, keep checking the buyer along connected accepted bids 
until:  
a. the buyer is a PB. All preceding bids form a Pattern 1 (PBPS); 
b. the buyer is a BS without an accepted bid at the seller side. All preceding 
bids form a Pattern 3 (BSPS). 
2. For each PB who has not been checked in the first step, the seller of the accepted 
bid must be a BS (otherwise the PB should be checked in the first step). Keep 
checking the BS until the buyer side has no accepted bid. All preceding bids 
form a Pattern 2 (PBBS). 
3. For each BS who is linked by only one bid, keep checking the BS on the other 
side of the bid until the latter BS has only one bid. All preceding bids form a 
Pattern 4.  
4. For those BS who have not been checked yet, their bids form loop patterns. 
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3.4 HOUSING PURCHASE RESTRICTION AND HOME BROKERAGE 
This section uses the ABM with buy-sellers to study the effects of housing purchase 
restrictions. Housing purchase restrictions (HPRs) in China have drawn a lot of attentions 
on its huge influence on markets and households. Current literature focuses on the 
effectiveness of this policy instrument using longitudinal housing price data in multiple 
cities and employing econometric method such as difference-in-differences analysis (Du 
& Zhang, 2015; Sun et al., 2017). These studies provide evidences on how HPR has 
reshaped the housing price growth. However, the micro mechanisms of HPR affecting 
intraurban housing market are still understudied.  
Intuitively, HPRs impose purchase amount constraints on some households so that 
their housing demand cannot be fulfilled. For households with necessary and urgent 
demand for new housing units, they would sell the current units and become buy-sellers 
(BS). Thus, one direct consequence of HPRs is the increase in the share of the buy-sellers 
(BS) on the market. This brings in new market supply as well as trading barriers due to the 
must-buy and must-sell restrictions of BS. There could be a considerable indirect impact 
on households who are not directly subject to the HPRs but connected to the BS households 
through the trading network. It would be interesting to know that with an increase in the 
share of BS whether the total transaction volume at each period would decrease and 
whether the average time-on-market (TOM) of households would increases. If they would, 
these are potential social costs of HPRs which have not been (and cannot be) studied in the 
tradition market framework.  
In addition, this ABM could also provide insights of roles of real estate brokerage 
in housing transactions. Real estate agents facilitate trades by providing information and 
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third-party guarantees to both buyers and sellers. This paper focuses on their function of 
providing binding contracts which would reduce frictions caused by BS. For example, 
contracts with home sale contingencies. These types of contracts are costly and less likely 
to be made without agents. In the areas with the dominant dual agencies, the effect is more 
influential. One would expect the real estate brokerage would offset the negative effects of 
HPRs by providing binding contracts to prevent trades involving BS from falling apart 
immediately.  
Therefore, in this section, one on hand, the effect of HPRs is regarded as an 
exogenous shock to the share of the BS on the market. Thus, the change in the BS market 
share represents the magnitude of HPRs. On the other hand, the term of contracts is used 
to proxy the power of real estate brokerage. The longer the term is, the more powerful the 
agents are.  
3.4.1 Simulation Scenarios  
This section conducts simulation in nine scenarios. There could be no HPR, mild HPR, or 
strong HPR; and at the same time weak, normal or strong brokerage. Correspondingly, the 
share of BS and the term of contracts are specified at different levels. The low, middle, and 
high shares of BS are set at 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively to represent the result from no 
HPR, mild HPR, and strong HPR. The existence of the 20% BS with the absence of HPRs 
is due to financial restrictions and reluctance to renting. The term of contracts is set to be 
1 round, 3 rounds, and 6 rounds, suggesting the length of simulation rounds within which 
a pending contract could hold.  
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Table 3.4   Simulation Scenarios 
 
Term of Contract 
Short 
(1 Round) 
Middle 
(3 Round) 
Long 
(6 Rounds) 
Share of 
BS 
Low 
(0.2) 
No HPR; 
Weak Brokerage 
No HPR; 
Normal Brokerage 
No HPR; 
Strong Brokerage 
Middle 
(0.4) 
Mild HPR; 
Weak Brokerage 
Mild HPR; 
Normal Brokerage 
Mild HPR; 
Strong Brokerage 
High 
(0.6) 
Strong HPR; 
Weak Brokerage 
Strong HPR; 
Normal Brokerage 
Strong HPR; 
Strong Brokerage 
3.4.2 Outcome Measure 
This simulation is essentially a comparative analysis. The effects of HPRs and 
home brokerage are obtained by comparing the outcomes of the nine scenarios. The section 
uses two measurements to evaluate the simulation outcome: total number of trades (TNT), 
i.e., the total number of successful trades; and average time on market (ATOM), i.e., the 
average time spent on searching or pending on the markets by the traded households.   
3.4.3 Model Setting 
For each scenario, specify the share of BS and the term of contracts. Initially, 
generate 500 buyers and 500 sellers on the market with the BS share. In each following 
round, add 200 new buyers and 200 new sellers to the simulation with the same BS share. 
The model runs 48 rounds and each round follows the process introduced in the previous 
section.   
3.4.4 Result 
The results are shown in Table 3.5 & 3.6. Stronger HPRs or weaker brokerage 
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would decrease the total number of trades and increase the average time-on-market. If there 
is no HPR and the brokerage is very strong, the market generates the largest number of 
trades and shortest time-on-market for each household. The change in HPR makes larger 
differences than the change in brokerage. Specifically, the market outcomes between 3-
round and 6-round term of contracts are very similar.  
Table 3.5   Total Number of Trades 
 
Brokerage 
Weak 
(1 Round) 
Normal 
(3 Round) 
Strong 
(6 Rounds) 
HPR 
No 
(0.2) 
7947 7971 7976 
Mild 
(0.4) 
5884 5962 5956 
Strong 
(0.6) 
3729 3950 3960 
 
Table 3.6   Average Time-on-market 
 
Brokerage 
Weak 
(1 Round) 
Normal 
(3 Round) 
Strong 
(6 Rounds) 
HPR 
No 
(0.2) 
2.623 1.871 1.864 
Mild 
(0.4) 
8.263 3.429 3.483 
Strong 
(0.6) 
22.294 7.946 7.298 
3.4.5 A Dynamic View 
The dynamic feature of our ABM allows us to examine the impact of HPR along 
time. Initially, there is no HPR. The model generates 500 buyers and 500 sellers with a low 
BS share equal to 0.2. Each following round adds 200 new buyers and 200 new sellers still 
 109 
with this low 0.2 share. A shock of HPR, either mild or strong, occurs in the 24th round, 
and from then on, the BS share increases to the corresponding level, 0.4 or 0.6. A total of 
48 rounds are executed. The whole process is conducted for three levels of brokerage.  
The result is show in Table 3.7. Apparently, the HPR shocks decrease the total 
number of trades and increase the average time-on-market of households. Strong HPRs 
have much stronger effects on both measurements. As the brokerage gets stronger, the 
extension of the term of contracts helps ameliorate the negative situations brought by 
HPRs.  
 
Table 3.7   Simulation Results for Dynamic View 
 
Total Number of Trades (TNT) Average Time-on-market (ATOM) 
Term = 
1 
  
Term = 
3 
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Term = 
6 
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3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the behavior of the buy-sellers (BS) in urban housing markets. The 
role of BS is discussed in a network framework and further studied in an agent-based model 
(ABM). The existence of BS influences market outcomes significantly. BS provides a new 
perspective to analyze housing market mechanisms and related policies.  
The major contribution of this paper is the development of an ABM for the buy-
sellers. The features of BS are incorporated and algorithms to identify trading network 
patterns are developed. This ABM is useful for empirical applications to regions where 
resale housing markets are dominant.    
In addition, the ABM is employed to analyze the impacts of housing purchase 
restriction (HPR) policies on market outcomes and the counter-effect from home 
brokerage. This paper views the HPR as an exogenous shock that changes pure-buyers into 
buy-sellers and represents the power of brokerage by the term length of contracts between 
buyers and sellers. Simulation results from different scenarios suggests HPR have negative 
impacts on housing markets in terms of decreasing total number of trades and increasing 
the average time-on-market. In contrast, a stronger brokerage would lead to better market 
performance. From a dynamic view, a HPR shock causes a sudden drop in the total number 
of trades, and a stronger brokerage would ameliorate the situation to some extent.  
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APPENDIX A   DATA CLEANING AND OUTLIER DETECTION 
The first step is to clean missing data and irrelevant housing types. Missing data (coded as 
missing, unknown or blank) occurs in many variables: listed total price, floor level, 
building type, year built, elevator, and heating. Irrelevant housing types are also deleted, 
involving underground housing units, one-story building (called “Ping Fang” in Chinese), 
non-commodity housing (such as affordable housing), non-condominium (such as 
apartment, detached house, and Chinese courtyard house), non-70-year right of use land 
(such as 40 or 50 years which infer commercial or mixed land use), and non-flat housing 
type (such as duplex or multi-story dwelling units). The amount of observations being 
deleted in each step are shown in Table A1. Data distributions across years before and after 
cleaning are summarized in Table A2.  
Table A1   Summary of Cleaning Variable 
Variable Deleted Value Deleted Amount 
Ratio to Total 
(386790) 
Repeated Records  1452 0.38% 
Listed Total Price Missing 2019 0.52% 
Floor Level Unknown 1389 0.36% 
 Underground 3239 0.84% 
Building Type Blank 4104 1.06% 
 One-storey (Ping Fang) 187 0.05% 
Year Built Unknown 7877 2.04% 
Elevator Unknown 10767 2.78% 
Owner-occupied Sector Not commodity housing  4800 1.24% 
Property Type Not condominium 18422 4.76% 
Right of Use Land Not 70 years 21142 5.47% 
Heating Missing 15021 3.88% 
Housing Type Not flat 3071 0.79% 
Total Deleted (With Repeating) 93490  
Total Deleted (Without Repeating) 49446 12.78% 
Left Count (Without Repeating) 337344 87.22% 
 
Table A2   Data Summary before and after Cleaning in Stage One 
 113 
Year 
Before After 
Deleted 
Count Percentage Count Percentage 
2012 52901 13.68% 46990 13.93% -5911 
2013 56141 14.51% 48659 14.42% -7482 
2014 45654 11.80% 40554 12.02% -5100 
2015 99583 25.75% 89038 26.39% -10545 
2016 132511 34.26% 112103 33.23% -20408 
Total 386790  337344  -49446 
 
The second step is to detect and clean outliers. Some outliers are obvious typos with 
unrealistic values—for example it is impossible to sell a housing unit at 10 RMB (about 
1.5 US Dollar) per square meter in Beijing from 2012 to 2016. Other outliers require 
statistical methods to detect. Typically, one may simply apply common outlier detection 
methods to the whole sample, such as the mean plus or minus three standard deviations 
and the interquartile range (IQR). However, this would be problematic for the case of this 
study. The data in this paper involves all districts of Beijing from 2012 to 2016, there exist 
huge intrinsic variations across locations and years. Hence, it is possible that the transaction 
prices in a peripheral area are statistically lower than those in the center and are wrongly 
identified as “outliers” of the whole sample. To avoid this, outliers should be detected in 
each small group of observations, in this paper, each location-year group. However, some 
groups have a small sample, which may result in over- or under-identification of outliers 
using the common approaches (Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). Recent studies suggest 
using median absolute deviation (MAD)21 to detect outliers (Leys et al., 2013). This paper 
applies this method and cleans the outliers in following steps and the data summary is in 
                                                 
21 MAD has also been used as the measure of the precision of estimators (see example in Honoré & 
Powell, 1994).  
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Table A3: 
1. Define and delete obvious typo observations. The upper bounds of floor area, listed 
total price, transacted total price, and transacted unit price are chosen as 500, 5000, 5000, 
and 500000 respectively; lower bounds as 10, 10, 10, and 1000 respectively. These bounds 
are conservatively selected and leave most data to the next step.  
2. In each year, delete locations with less than 5 observations.  
3. Check each observation in its location-year group using the MAD method. 
Specifically, for each group, calculate the median absolute deviation (MAD) for the 𝑘th 
variable as 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝑘 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(|𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐱𝑘)|), where 𝑏 = 1.4826, 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is the 𝑘th 
variable value of the 𝑖th observation in the group, and 𝐱𝑘 is the vector of the 𝑘th variable 
value in the group (Leys et al., 2013); delete the 𝑖th observation from this groups if for any 
𝑘, 𝑥𝑖𝑘 is not in the interval [ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐱𝑘) − 3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝑘 , 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐱𝑘) + 3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝑘]. The 
variables are floor area, listed total price, transacted total price, and transacted unit price. 
4. Repeat the previous two steps until there is no new deletion.  
Table A3   Data Summary for Outlier Detection 
Year 
Before 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
After 
Count 
Percentag
e 
Count 
Percentag
e 
2012 46990 13.93% 
-514 
(together
) 
-3283 -6676 36823 13.62% 
2013 48659 14.42% -3411 -7111 38031 14.07% 
2014 40554 12.02% -3665 -7333 29463 10.90% 
2015 89038 26.39% -3004 -11761 74200 27.45% 
2016 112103 33.23% -2814 -17499 91756 33.95% 
Total 337344  336830 -16177 -50380 270273  
 
The third step deletes observations based on empirical and estimation consideration. 
First, to avoid additional heterogeneity, this paper removes 5725 records of Yanjiaozhen 
from the cleaned sample. Yanjiaozhen is a town in Hebei Province, bordering Beijing to 
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the west. Its adjacency to Beijing, less restrictive housing policies, and low housing prices 
attract housing buyers and agencies like Lianjia to make transactions in this alternative 
market. However, despite of its connectedness to Beijing, Yanjiaozhen has very different 
market structures and bring in heterogeneity. Second, buildings/locations with only one 
observation are removed because they make no contribution to within building variations. 
In the cleaned sample, there are only 6 buildings with only one observation.  
  Table A4   Data Summary for Third Step 
Year 
Before 
Yanjiaozhen 
Buildings with 
only one 
observation 
After 
Count 
Percentag
e 
Count 
Percentag
e 
2012 36823 13.62% 
-5725 
(together) 
-6 
(together) 
36823 13.92% 
2013 38031 14.07% 38031 14.38% 
2014 29463 10.90% 29349 11.09% 
2015 74200 27.45% 72058 27.24% 
2016 91756 33.95% 88281 33.37% 
Total 270273    264542  
 
The last step is to look at the variable statistics and further clean the variables with 
suspicious values. There are several variables worth noticing. First, the number of kitchens. 
There are 1224 observations with the number of kitchen different from one. Most of them 
are typos. To avoid noises, we delete all 1224 observations. Second, the number of other 
rooms. There are 433 observations with either more than five bedrooms (53 in total 
including 47 with six and 6 with seven) or more than two living rooms (320 in total 
including 313 with three and 7 with seven) or more than three bathrooms (103 in total 
including 97 with four and 6 with five). These observations are possibly multi-storey units 
but wrongly tagged as flats. So this paper excludes them from consideration. Last, for 
further use of the location variables, we have some locations (complexes) with no 
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information of school districts. These locations only involve 348 observations. We exclude 
these observations from further analyses.  
 
Table A5   Data Summary for Final Round 
Year 
Before Number of 
kitchen 
unequal to 
one 
Number of 
rooms 
abnormal 
Corresponding 
location has no 
school 
information 
Buildings with 
only one 
observation 
After 
Count Percentage Count 
Percent
age 
2012 36823 13.92% 
-1224 
(together) 
-433 
(together) 
-348 
(together) 
-4 
(together) 
36571 13.93% 
2013 38031 14.38% 37784 14.39% 
2014 29349 11.09% 29159 11.11% 
2015 72058 27.24% 71573 27.26% 
2016 88281 33.37% 87446 33.31% 
Total 264542      262533  
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APPENDIX B   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUM SQUARED DIFFERENCES AND 
SUM SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN 
In this appendix, I compare the sum squared differences (𝑆𝑆?̂?) and the traditional 
measurement of deviation, i.e. the sum squared deviations from the mean (𝑆𝑆𝐷?̂?).  
Scenario One: 𝑵 Observations in One Cluster 
First, I consider the situation that 𝑁 observations in one cluster (or without cluster 
structure). For observation 𝑖, its observed value is denoted as 𝑥𝑖. Thus, 
𝑆𝑆?̂? = ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃 ,                                  (A1)                     
where 𝑃 ≡ {(𝑖, 𝑗): 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗} denotes all pairs of observations. Using ?̅? =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑁 , I rewrite 
(A1) as 
                       𝑆𝑆?̂? = ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅? + ?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)
2
𝑃                                                             (A2) 
                                 = ∑ [(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2 + (?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)
2 + 2(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)]𝑃  
                                  = ∑ [(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2 + (?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)
2]𝑃 + ∑ [2(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)]𝑃  
                                  = (𝑁 − 1)∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑁 + 2∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)𝑃         (A3) 
Note that the first term on the RHS is the variance of all 𝑁 observations. For the 
second term on the RHS,  
                                            2∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)𝑃                                                   (A4) 
                                               = 2∑ (𝑥𝑖?̅? + ?̅?𝑥𝑗 − ?̅?
2 − 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗)𝑃                   
                                              = 2[∑ (𝑥𝑖?̅? + ?̅?𝑥𝑗)𝑃 − ∑ ?̅?
2
𝑃 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ]  
                                    = 2[(𝑁 − 1)∑ (𝑥𝑖?̅?)𝑁 −
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
?̅?2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ]  
                                               = 2[𝑁(𝑁 − 1)?̅?
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑁 −
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
?̅?2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ]  
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                                                     = 2[𝑁(𝑁 − 1)?̅?2 −
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
?̅?2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
?̅?2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
𝑁(𝑁−1)
2
1
𝑁2
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑁 )
2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
𝑁−1
2𝑁
(∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑁 + 2∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ) − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
𝑁−1
2𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑁 +
𝑁−1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
𝑁−1
2𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑁 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
1
2𝑁
∑ (𝑥𝑖
2 + 𝑥𝑗
2)𝑃 −
1
2𝑁
∑ 2𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
1
2𝑁
∑ (𝑥𝑖
2 − 2𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 + 𝑥𝑗
2)𝑃 ] 
                                                     = 2[
1
2𝑁
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
𝑃 ]  
                                                     =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
𝑃                                                              (A5) 
Take (A1) into (A5), then (A4) can be rewritten as 
              2∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(?̅? − 𝑥𝑗)𝑃 =
1
𝑁
 𝑆𝑆?̂?.                                                 (A6) 
Take (A6) back into (A3) 
                                      𝑆𝑆?̂? = (𝑁 − 1)∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑁 +
1
𝑁
 𝑆𝑆?̂?.                                    (A7) 
From (A7), I could get  
                                      𝑆𝑆?̂? = 𝑁 ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑁 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐷?̂?.                               (A9) 
 Thus, 𝑆𝑆?̂? equals to 𝑁 times 𝑆𝑆𝐷?̂? when all observations are in the same cluster. 
 
Scenario Two: 𝑵 Observations in 𝑮 Clusters 
Now, considering 𝑁 observations in 𝐺 clusters, the sum squared differences (𝑆𝑆?̂?) 
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for all within-cluster pairs is 
                                                 𝑆𝑆?̂? = ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑔 − 𝑥𝑗𝑔)
2
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑃𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 ,                       (A10) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑔 is the 𝑖th observation in cluster 𝑔; and 𝑃𝑔 ≡ {(𝑖, 𝑗): 𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗} 
is the set of pairs of observations of cluster 𝑔. From scenario one, for each cluster 𝑔, 
     ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑔 − 𝑥𝑗𝑔)
2
𝑃𝑔 = 𝑁𝑔 ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
2𝑁𝑔
𝑖=1 ,                           (A11) 
where 𝑁𝑔 is number of observations in cluster 𝑔.  
Take (A11) into (A10), 
𝑆𝑆?̂? = ∑ 𝑁𝑔 ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
2
𝑖𝑔 .                                     (A12) 
If every cluster has the same size 𝑁𝑔 = 𝑁/𝐺 for all 𝑔, then (A12) becomes 
𝑆𝑆?̂? =
𝑁
𝐺
∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑔 − ?̅?𝑔)
2
𝑖𝑔 . 
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APPENDIX C   EQUIVALENCE AND DEVIATION CONDITIONS 
 
Equivalence Conditions: The mediant equals to the weighted mediant if any of the 
following condition holds:  
a. (equal-weight condition) all weights are equal: 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛 and 𝑤 ∈ ℝ>0; 
b. (equal-fraction condition) all fractions are equal: 
𝑎𝑖
𝑏𝑖
=
𝑎
𝑏
 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛 and 𝑎 ∈ ℝ≥0, 𝑏 ∈ ℝ>0. 
Proof (a): If 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛,  
 𝑚𝑤 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑤𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚             
Q.E.D. 
Proof (b): If 
𝑎𝑖
𝑏𝑖
=
𝑎
𝑏
 for all 𝑖 = 1…𝑛, then 𝑎𝑖 =
𝑎
𝑏
𝑏𝑖, 
𝑚𝑤 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑎
𝑏
𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎
𝑏
(∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎
𝑏
  
𝑚 = (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 = (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑
𝑎
𝑏
𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎
𝑏
(∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
−1 ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎
𝑏
                             
Q.E.D. 
 
Deviation Condition: If a relatively larger fraction 
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛
 is associated with a relatively larger 
weight 𝑤𝑛, then 𝑚𝑤 > 𝑚. In another word, if the covariance between 
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛
 and 𝑤𝑛 is positive, 
then 𝑚𝑤 > 𝑚; otherwise, 𝑚𝑤 < 𝑚. I will show a simple case when  𝑛 = 2, and a 
simulation with 𝑛 > 2.  
For 𝑛 = 2, suppose 𝑎1 = 3, 𝑎2 = 2, 𝑏1 = 1, 𝑏2 = 4, then 
𝑎1
𝑏1
= 
3
1
, 
𝑎2
𝑏2
=
2
4
, and 
𝑎1
𝑏1
>
𝑎2
𝑏2
. The mediant 𝑚 =
𝑎1+𝑎2
𝑏1+𝑏2
  equals to 
3+2
1+4
=
5
5
, which is between the two fraction values. 
In a vector graph, viewing fractions as slopes, the mediant 𝑚 can be viewed as the slope of 
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the sum vector ?⃗⃗?  of 𝑣1⃗⃗⃗⃗ = (𝑎1, 𝑏1) and 𝑣2⃗⃗⃗⃗ = (𝑎2, 𝑏2), and by parallelogram law,  
𝑎2
𝑏2
< 𝑚 <
𝑎1
𝑏1
.  
Now consider two weighting scenarios: 𝑤′ = (𝑤1
′ , 𝑤2
′) = (2, 1) and 𝑤′′ =
(𝑤1
′′, 𝑤2
′′) = (1, 2). The first scenario assigns larger weight to the larger fraction, while the 
second does the opposite. As a result, the weighted mediants are 𝑚𝑤
′ =
2𝑎1+𝑎2
2𝑏1+𝑏2
=
8
6
 
and 𝑚𝑤
′′ =
𝑎1+2𝑎2
𝑏1+2𝑏2
=
7
9
. Hence, 
𝑚𝑤
′′ < 𝑚 < 𝑚𝑤
′ . 
This case provides much of the intuition for the more general case. It concludes that 
if a larger fraction is weighted with larger weights, the weighted mediant is larger than the 
unweighted mediant, and vice versa. Figure C1 provides good illustration for this point as 
well. If the steeper vector 𝑣1⃗⃗⃗⃗  (larger fraction) receives larger weights than the flatter one 
𝑣2⃗⃗⃗⃗  (smaller fraction) as in scenario one, the mediant vector ?⃗⃗?  will be “lifted up” and 
become 𝑚𝑤
′ ; otherwise (as in scenario two), the mediant vector ?⃗⃗?  will be “dragged down” 
and become 𝑚𝑤
′′ .  
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Figure C1   Mediant and Weighted Mediant 
For 𝑛 > 2, I hypothesize that if larger weights are assigned to larger fractions (i.e. 
positive correlation between weights and fractions), the change from mediant to weighted 
median 𝑚𝑤 − 𝑚 is larger. A simulation is conducted to examine this hypothesis. In each 
round, sequences {𝑎𝑛}, {𝑏𝑛}, and {𝑤𝑛} are drawn from a uniform distribution over [1: 100] 
with replacement. Correlation between 𝑤𝑛 and 𝑎𝑛/𝑏𝑛 is calculated and denoted as 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟. 
Then, mediant 𝑚 and weighted mediant 𝑚𝑤 are calculated and their difference is denoted 
as 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 = 𝑚𝑤 − 𝑚. Let 𝑛 = (5, 10, 25, 100, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000). For each 
value of 𝑛, repeat 5000 rounds. The results (Figure C2) show a significant positive 
correlation between the weight-fraction covariance and change from mediant to weighted 
mediant.  
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Figure C2   Correlation between Weight-fraction Covariance and Mediant Change 
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